


Breaking Down Gender Biases

Shifting social norms towards
gender equality





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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

Breaking down gender biases

Shifting social norms towards gender equality

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Executive summary

Without tackling biased gender social norms, we will not achieve gender equality, as reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Biased gender social norms—the undervaluation of women’s capabilities and rights in society—constrain women’s choices and opportunities by regulating behaviour and setting the boundaries of what women are expected to do and be.¹ Biased gender social norms are a major impediment to achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls (SDG 5).

Gender bias is a pervasive problem worldwide. The Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) quantifies biases against women, capturing people’s attitudes on women’s roles along four key dimensions: political, educational, economic and physical integrity. The index, covering 85 percent of the global population, reveals that close to 9 out of 10 men and women hold biases against women. Nearly half the world’s people believe that men make better political leaders than women do, and two of five people believe that men make better business executives than women do. Gender biases are pronounced in both lower and higher Human Development Index (HDI) countries. These biases hold across regions, income levels and cultures—making them a global issue.

Gender social norms also persist over time, as shown by GSNI values, which have stagnated over the past decade. This second GSNI report, capturing data up to 2022, shows little overall progress, despite powerful global and local campaigns for women’s rights in recent years, such as Me Too, Ni Una Menos, Time’s Up and Un Violador en Tu Camino.

Biased gender social norms may be impeding women’s economic empowerment. Recent evidence shows a broken link between women’s access

to education and achievements in economic empowerment. Today, average income gaps between women and men are correlated more strongly with measures of gender social norms than with gaps in education. In countries with higher bias in gender social norms, women spend more time than men—as much as six times as much—on domestic chores and care work.

Biased gender social norms hold women back from becoming leaders. Even though many formal barriers to women holding political office have been removed in most countries, gender gaps in political representation remain high. On average, the share of heads of state or government who are women has remained around 10 percent worldwide since 1995, and women hold just over a quarter of parliament seats globally.² Women leaders are often judged more harshly than their male counterparts. When women become leaders, changes in social norms can go either towards greater acceptance of women’s leadership or towards a stronger backlash against women.

Biased gender social norms not only limit freedoms and choices for women but also deprive societies from the benefits of women’s leadership. Social norms that inhibit women’s representation in decisionmaking deprive societies of the many benefits of women’s leadership and of diversity of perspectives, experiences, abilities, voices and ideas.

Challenging biased gender social norms is a choice we can make today. To drive change towards greater gender equality, we need to focus on expanding human development through investment, insurance and innovation. Education, recognition and representation can directly address biased gender social norms.

Achieving gender equality requires eliminating biased gender social norms

The world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030.³ The global Gender Inequality Index (GII) value, UNDP's composite measure of gender inequality in empowerment, has remained stagnant since 2019. The outlook is further diminished by a global backlash against women's rights and the lasting devastation of the multidimensional human development crises that followed the Covid-19 pandemic. In many parts of the world, movements against gender equality have gained traction, and women's rights have been rolled back.⁴ These setbacks are unfolding against a human development crisis: the global HDI value declined in 2020 for the first time on record—and again the following year.

While considerable progress for women has been achieved in many basic capabilities,⁵ such as the right to vote⁶ and equal participation in education,⁷ progress has been tenuous in enhanced capabilities, such as women's voice and power. From corporate boardrooms to presidential cabinets, women remain underrepresented in leadership positions. Women have accounted for around 10 percent of heads of state or government since 1995,⁸ leaving them at the margins of decisionmaking in the 21st century. Why do we see these gender-based inequalities in empowerment? As argued in this report, it is partly because of biased gender social norms—the undervaluation of women's capabilities and rights in society.

“Gender social norms profoundly shape attitudes, social relationships and power dynamics, so they matter a great deal for upholding (or addressing) injustice, as well as for shaping agency

Gender social norms profoundly shape attitudes, social relationships and power dynamics, so they matter a great deal for upholding (or addressing) injustice, as well as for shaping agency.⁹ That nearly half of people believe men make better political leaders than women do¹⁰ can shed light on why, despite the removal of many formal barriers to holding political office, women still face an uphill battle in attaining and exercising political power.¹¹ The gender-based biases we carry into voting booths, board meetings, interview panels and assemblies present barriers to women's ability to fulfil their full potential. Policies

to achieve comprehensive gender equality have to be designed and implemented to address biased gender social norms.

The GSNI measures the prevalence of biased social norms that impede gender equality. This report presents an update of the GSNI based on the most recent data for 2017–2022.¹² Using data from 80 countries and territories covering 85 percent of the global population, the 2023 GSNI paints a portrait of dominant and widespread gender-based biases across countries and time. This report pays special attention to biases against women's economic empowerment and political participation, argues that gender social norms can and do change and suggests how we can advance this change.

Persistent biased gender social norms can violate human rights and limit the enlargement of wellbeing and agency (by impeding women from acting on behalf of their own values and interests). By excluding women from social choice and decisionmaking, we lose out on perspectives, experiences, abilities, voices and ideas, making everyone worse off.

A world of widespread biases against women

The GSNI tracks people's attitudes towards women in four dimensions—political, educational, economic and physical integrity—to examine how biased beliefs can support or obstruct gender equality and respect human rights (see box 1 for details on how the GSNI is computed).

Biased gender social norms are widespread worldwide: almost 90 percent of people have at least one bias (figure 1). Biases are prevalent among both men and women (figure 2)—suggesting that these biases are deeply embedded in society, reflecting widely shared social norms. Gender biases are an issue in both lower and higher HDI countries. Even in countries with the least gender bias, more than a quarter of people have at least one bias, demonstrating that these biases hold across continents, income levels and cultures—making them a global issue (see table A1 at the end of the report).

Almost half the world's people think that men make better political leaders than women do, and 43 percent think that men make better business executives than women do (figure 3). By objective

Box 1 What is the Gender Social Norms Index?

The Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) captures beliefs on gender equality in capabilities and rights. First introduced in the 2019 Human Development Report, it differs from achievement-based objective measures of gender equality, which assess gender gaps in terms of outcomes.¹ By focusing on beliefs, biases and prejudices, it provides an in-depth account of the root causes of gender inequality that hinder progress for women and girls.²

The GSNI is calculated using data from the World Values Survey (WVS).³ It covers four key dimensions—political, educational, economic and physical integrity—to highlight areas where women and girls face systematic disadvantages and discrimination. Each dimension is characterized by one or two indicators of biases against women (box figure). For example, the economic dimension has two indicators: one measuring whether people think “men should have more right to a job than women” and the other whether people think “men make better business executives than women do.”


Each indicator takes a value of 1 when an individual has a bias and 0 when the individual does not. For

indicators for which the answer choices are strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree (or agree, disagree and neither), the index defines individuals with a bias as those who answer strongly agree or agree. For indicators reported on a numerical scale, the index defines individuals with a bias as those whose answers fall into a certain range, which varies by indicator (box table).

Two GSNI values are computed using different methods of aggregation. The first—the core GSNI value, used in this report—measures the percentage of people with at least one bias. The second—the GSNI2 value—measures the percentage of people with at least two biases, reporting the share of people with moderate to intense bias. Both indexes range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher bias against gender equality and women’s empowerment. Recording the share of people with no bias (among the seven indicators) is also informative for tracking progress.

(continued)

Dimensions and indicators of the Gender Social Norms Index



Source: Human Development Report Office.

measures, women are underrepresented in politics, public administration and business leadership. Only 11 percent of heads of state and 9 percent of heads of government are women,¹³ and women hold only 22 percent of ministerial posts. The majority of these

ministerial roles are in the ministries of women, children, youth, the elderly, the disabled or social and environmental sectors.¹⁴ In the paid economy women hold only 28 percent of managerial positions.¹⁵ The magnitude of the inequality, paired with

Box 1 What is the Gender Social Norms Index? (continued)

Definition of bias, by indicator

Dimension	Indicator	Choices	Definition of bias
Political	Women having the same rights as men is essential for democracy	0, it is against democracy, 1, not essential, to 10, essential	Values from 0 to 7
	Men make better political leaders than women do	Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree	Strongly agree and agree
Educational	University is more important for men than for women	Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree	Strongly agree and agree
Economic	Men should have more right to a job than women	Agree, disagree, neither	Agree
	Men make better business executives than women do	Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree	Strongly agree and agree
Physical integrity	Proxy for intimate partner violence	1, never, to 10, always	Values from 2 to 10
	Proxy for reproductive rights	1, never, to 10, always	Value of 1

Note: The table summarizes the survey information; see the *Technical note* for comprehensive information.

Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera-Vazquez and Tapia 2019.

For this update, data are from wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the WVS, the latest publicly available data as of 12 January 2023. The results are presented in the annex tables at the end of the report. Table A1 presents core GSNI and GSNI2 values, the share of people with no bias and the share of people biased by dimension for 80 countries and territories (accounting for 85 percent of the world population) with data from either wave 6 or wave 7, and table A2 disaggregates those results by gender. Table A3a presents the same indicators for 38 countries and territories (accounting for 47 percent of the world population) with data for both wave 6 and wave 7, allowing comparison over time, and table A3b disaggregates those results by gender. Table A4 presents Gender Development Index values

for 172 countries, and table A5 presents Gender Inequality Index values for 170 countries.

Notes

See the *Technical note* for more details on the GSNI.


1. One example is the Gender Development Index, which is a direct measure of the gender gap on the Human Development Index. It indicates the difference in achievements between women and men in three basic human development dimensions: health, education and standard of living. **2.** Other efforts to look beyond achievement-based measures include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD 2023) Social Institutions and Gender Index, which examines the underlying drivers of discriminatory social institutions and practices that lead to gender gaps. Other related measures of gender biases include the World Bank's (World Bank 2023) Women, Business and the Law Index, UN Women and Unstereotype Alliance's (UN Women and Unstereotype Alliance 2022) Gender Equality Attitudes Study and Sustainable Development Goal Indicator 5.1.1. **3.** Inglehart 2022.

the very limited formal constraints to women's participation at the highest levels of leadership, points to the substantial role that biases may be playing in affecting women's prospects and options to emerge as leaders. Even when women reach leadership positions, gender biases lead to unequal treatment and judgement (box 2).

All biased gender social norms are potentially harmful, but perhaps none has a more direct impact on women's agency and wellbeing than those leading to violence against women and girls. Today,


more than a quarter of the world's people believe that it is justifiable for a man to beat his wife. A similar share (26 percent) of women over age 15 have experienced intimate partner violence.¹⁶ Even social norms not explicitly linked to violence can result in violence against women and girls. For example, social norms that support men's social or physical control over women (including over their assets) can increase the risk of intimate partner violence or sexual abuse.¹⁷ Contexts of crisis tend to intensify violence against women and girls. For example,

Figure 1 Close to 90 percent of people have at least one bias in gender social norms



Note: Based on 80 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) or wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 85 percent of the global population.
Source: Human Development Report Office using data from the World Values Survey.

Figure 2 Biases in gender social norms are prevalent among both men and women



Note: Based on 80 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) or wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 85 percent of the global population.
Source: Human Development Report Office using data from the World Values Survey.

intimate partner violence tends to increase in crisis settings, and sexual violence has been used as a warfare tool.¹⁸


Social norms biases can influence patterns of violence against women and girls.¹⁹ People who believe that violence is acceptable might directly enforce it or justify it. Social norms permissive of violence also make it difficult for women to denounce and escape violence, since social acceptance constrains support mechanisms and discourages women from seeking a path out.

Gender biases inhibit women's agency and deprive the world of the benefits of women's leadership

Agency is central to human development. It stands apart from wellbeing achievements and wellbeing freedoms,²⁰ two other dimensions of the human capability approach, by focusing on the freedom to do and achieve what people regard as important or what they, as responsible agents, have reason to value. This may or may not be aligned with their wellbeing achievements, but it reflects their reasoning.²¹ For example, a young teenager highly invested in the future of the planet might forgo a day of school to support the passing of legislation protecting the environment. She may be worse off in her wellbeing achievement, having obtained one less day of formal education, but would be exercising her agency by acting, as a responsible agent, in pursuit of her own idea of good.

Biased gender social norms hinder women's agency in several dimensions. This section explores two areas central to women's agency—economic empowerment and political participation—where biased gender social norms are linked to unequal outcomes for women. It goes on to explore what societies could gain if gender biases were not so prevalent when gauging a leader's potential by his or her gender. What are we missing out on as societies because we have so few women leaders? Would the world look different if we had gender parity in leadership? Could equal participation of women in key decisionmaking areas better equip us to deal with challenges such as pandemics, climate change and conflict? What do we stand to lose if we continue to exclude women in decisionmaking?

Figure 3 Biases are prevalent across all dimensions of gender social norms



Note: Higher values indicate higher proportions of people with biases against women. Based on 80 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) or wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 85 percent of the global population.


Source: Human Development Report Office using data from the World Values Survey.

Box 2 How social norms shift when women become leaders: unwarranted responsibility?

Women heads of state or government are often profiled, celebrated, observed and rightfully considered “trail-blazers” for all women. There is overwhelming evidence that the presence of women leaders can reduce biases against women leaders through visibility and representation, providing role models that can be powerful inspirations for change.¹ But women leaders are often observed through a gender lens and are not judged solely for their performance.²

Having female leaders at the highest levels of government often leads to more pronounced changes in gender social norms *in both directions*. The share of people with no biases in gender social norms varied by 7.6 percentage points on average for countries with a female head of state or government in the past decade compared with 2.7 percentage points for countries without one (box figure). Although it remains unclear whether the presence of a female head of state or government causes this more pronounced change in gender biases, these results raise the question: Are we judging all women through the example of one? Will an unpopular female leader prompt a backlash in biased gender social norms affecting all women? Would that be fair?

Countries with a female head of state or government in the past decade show greater variation in the prevalence of biased gender social norms



Note: Based on 38 countries where the share of people with no bias changed between 2014 and 2022.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations using data from the World Values Survey and Varieties of Democracy Project (2023).

Notes

1. Latu and others 2013; Lockwood 2006. 2. Duflo and Topalova 2004; Johnson and others 2008; Rudman and others 2012.

Biases and gaps in economic empowerment and political participation


Closing education gaps is expected to reduce income disparities. Policies aimed at achieving equal participation in education have been effective: gender gaps in education have been closing.²² Women have been catching up in education—with higher enrolment and completion in all levels²³—becoming more educated than prior generations. But gender gaps in economic empowerment persist, suggesting that the recent increase in education achievements has not translated into better economic outcomes and opportunities for women. Even in the 59 countries where adult women are more educated than men, the average income gap is 39 percent.²⁴ The lack of progress in closing the gender gap in income has been observed globally. Even in high HDI countries, large gender gaps in labour markets and economic outcomes are common.²⁵ As women catch up in education, persistent gender gaps in income can no longer be explained by gaps in education (figure 4).²⁶ Instead, gender gaps in

income tend to be highly correlated with GSNI values (figure 5).

These findings indicate that persistent gender income gaps are linked to deep-rooted social norms and gender stereotypes. These patterns are in line with recent studies showing that women's incomes are impacted by a “child penalty,” arising from social expectations that women devote more time to child-care than men.²⁷ Gender stereotypes also contribute to the undervaluing of women's contributions.²⁸

Progress towards gender equality requires policies tackling biased gender social norms. There is a strong correlation between GSNI value and gender inequality, as reflected in the GII, which measures gender inequality by looking at three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market (figure 6). The GII value in the countries with the highest bias (those in the highest GSNI quartile) is more than five times that of countries with the lowest biases (those in the lowest GSNI quartile). The gender gap in time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work is also positively


Figure 4 Gender gaps in education might no longer be linked to gender gaps in income



Note: Each dot shows coefficient estimate in a linear regression model of gender gaps in income on gender gaps in education across countries. The vertical lines above and below the dots represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Source: Human Development Report Office estimation based on data from table A4.


Figure 5 Gender gaps in income have a strong statistical association with biased gender social norms



Note: The figure shows the estimated coefficients of a model regressing gender gaps in income on gender gaps in education and on Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) values using the latest year of data in tables A1 and A4. The vertical lines above and below the dots represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations.

Figure 6 Gender inequality tends to be higher in countries with greater gender bias




Note: For each Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI) quartile the box plots the middle 50 percent of the distribution of Gender Inequality Index values, the central line is the median and the extreme lines are the minimum and maximum of the distribution.

Source: Human Development Report Office.

correlated with GSNI value (figure 7). Women's time spent on unpaid care work relative to men's, regardless of education, accounts for most of the recent variation in the gender gap in income. In countries with less bias (Q1 in figure 7), women spend twice as much time, on average, on domestic chores and care work as men. As bias increases, so does the female

Figure 7 In countries with the highest levels of biased gender social norms, women spend over six times as much time as men on domestic chores and care work



GSNI is Gender Social Norms Index.

Source: Human Development Report Office.


to male ratio—to more than sixfold for countries with the highest bias (Q4).

Gender inequality is stark in positions of leadership. Women account for 28 percent of managers and 31 percent of top leaders in public administration.²⁹ The percentage declines as one moves up the ladder of political and economic power. Today, women have the right to vote and run for political office virtually everywhere in the world.³⁰ Yet, on average, women hold just over a quarter of parliament seats³¹ and 22 percent of ministerial positions.³² At the very top the share of heads of state or government who are women has remained around 10 percent since 1995 (figure 8).³³

Biased gender social norms might contribute to the gridlock on equal participation in politics.³⁴ In some cases biases might even intensify in the form of backlash when women attain leadership positions.³⁵ Countries with greater bias in gender social norms also show lower presence of women in parliament (figure 9). Indigenous women, migrant women and women with disabilities have particularly low representation in politics,³⁶ demonstrating how overlapping biases could further reduce opportunities for women.


Political rights and civil liberties have been in decline worldwide for at least a decade.³⁷ Shrinking global freedoms and rising polarization³⁸ have been accompanied by backlash against gender equality and women's

Figure 8 Globally, women remain underrepresented at the highest levels of political office



Note: Calculations are based on the sex of the head of state or government of 193 UN Member States for head of government and excluding monarchy-based countries for head of state. A country was counted as having a woman in highest political office if either the head of state or government was a woman. The value for each year represents a rolling average of the previous five years (for example, the value for 1995 is an average of the percentages in 1991–1995).
Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Varieties of Democracy Project.

Figure 9 Women’s presence in parliament is higher in countries with lower biases in gender social norms



Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Varieties of Democracy Project.

rights,³⁹ affecting entire societies by shifting power relations.⁴⁰ In addition to discriminatory social norms, the backlash has also been seen through extremism⁴¹ and gendered disinformation, putting democratic practices under stress and risking women's equal participation in politics and civic spaces, and through backsliding of gender equality laws and policies.

Benefits of women's leadership

According to article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all people have the right to participate in their country's affairs, either directly or by selecting representatives.⁴² Biased gender social norms constitute a barrier for women's participation and can impede the effective exercise of several human rights.

“Opening doors for women leaders also opens doors to learning from their experiences and insights, enlarging diversity

This exclusion is consequential. At a time of heightened uncertainty, worsening climate challenges and rising polarization, excluding women from decision-making inhibits collective action and closes doors to possible pathways towards addressing shared challenges.

Women's participation in politics diversifies policy agendas and has a positive effect on a range of policy outcomes—from health and childcare to environmental quality, tax revenue and military engagement.⁴³ Women leaders also pay greater attention to the needs of women, children and marginalized communities.⁴⁴ Further, empowering women results in higher human capital accumulation and economic growth over the long run.⁴⁵ Women's increased presence and leading role in public administration is highly correlated with higher quality public services and improved development outcomes.⁴⁶ Recent evidence shows that women tend to balance long-term priorities with short-term goals. Men are more likely to make extreme choices—such as being very safe or very risky, being very fair or very unfair, or being very trusting or very untrusting—relative to women, who are more likely to be moderate in their behaviour and choices.⁴⁷

Take the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic, when national leaders had to manage a combined health,

education and economic crisis. Some countries with female leaders better contained the pandemic's spread or experienced a lower death rate than countries without a woman in the highest office.⁴⁸ While the unique circumstances in each country determined how the pandemic played out, important lessons can be drawn from the policies supported by women leaders. They brought medical and health experts and scientists into the emergency health response. They followed successful models of testing, tracing and isolation. And they demonstrated the connectedness of the crisis in health, education and economy through integrated policies.

Opening doors for women leaders also opens doors to learning from their experiences and insights, enlarging diversity. Consider the health sector. Women make up 70 percent of the health workforce and social care workforce globally but hold only 25 percent of senior positions and 5 percent of leadership positions in health organizations.⁴⁹ This limits the opportunity to integrate women's expertise, knowledge and experience from the field in the design of national health policies. The health system could be stronger if more women were brought in from the field to positions of leadership and influence.

Also consider women's possible role as leaders in conflict-affected countries, where women continue to be underrepresented.⁵⁰ Women were largely underrepresented at the negotiation tables in the recent conflicts in Ukraine (0 percent), Yemen (4 percent) and Afghanistan (10 percent).⁵¹ Globally, about 7 of 10 peace processes did not include any women mediators or women signatories.⁵² And in conflict and postconflict countries women hold only 19 percent of parliament seats.⁵³

When engaged meaningfully, women can move the needle in discussions of peace processes.⁵⁴ But the emphasis must go beyond inclusion to ensuring that women have spaces to share their voices and influence decisionmaking.⁵⁵ In 2000 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, demonstrating the important role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.⁵⁶

Women's participation can also strengthen the sustainability of peace.⁵⁷ Women often raise issues beyond ceasefire and military action, negotiating institutional reforms, social and economic recovery plans, and transitional justice plans that contribute to the durability of

peace processes.⁵⁸ In a study of 156 peace agreements signed between 1989 to 2011, women’s participation was found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the durability of peace.⁵⁹

Researchers from behavioural sciences, sociology and psychology have also found that women’s security is strongly correlated with collective security.⁶⁰ Treatment of women cuts across all levels of society—echoing the degree of public reasoning and debate in society, as well as outcomes related to violent conflict.⁶¹ A growing literature indicates a link between gender inequality and violent outcomes.⁶² For example, states that fail to provide basic protection for women have greater gender-based inequalities in families and lower representation of women in state decisionmaking bodies.⁶³

Norms are persistent—but they can change

Social norms tend to persist and are generally difficult to change (box 3). When norms do change, attitudes are often altered through influential people in groups, or harmful social norms and practices are weakened by exposing people to information about the negative effects of norms.⁶⁴ Tipping points can be reached when enough people hold attitudes against an existing norm, often leading to a cascade effect when shifts in attitude among a few influence more and more people to adopt the new norm.⁶⁵ However, not all social norms shift through these processes of tipping, particularly when beliefs and behaviors are also associated with group identity.⁶⁶

That the global GSNI value changed little over the past decade shows the persistence of social norms. Across 38 countries with data for both wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey (accounting for 47 percent of the world population), the share of people with at least one bias decreased modestly, from 86.9 percent to 84.6 percent (table 1). Progress was greater among men (3.0 percentage points) than women (1.5 percentage points). The share of people with no bias in any indicator rose in 27 of the 38 countries, with the largest increases in Germany, Uruguay, New Zealand, Singapore and Japan, in that order (figure 10).⁶⁷ The largest declines were in Chile, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Russian Federation and Kyrgyzstan.⁶⁸

Table 1 A decade of stagnation in Gender Social Normal Index value at the global level

Group	Share of people with at least one bias		
	Percent		Change (percentage points)
	2010–2014	2017–2022	
Women	84.4	83.0	–1.5
Men	89.5	86.5	–3.0
Total	86.9	84.6	–2.3

Note: Based on 38 countries and territories with data from both wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 47 percent of the global population.

Source: Human Development Report Office using data from the World Values Survey.

When norms do change, they sometimes manifest through triggers. The past few decades saw major breakthroughs in gender social norms influenced by policies, regulations, scientific breakthroughs that then interacted to reach tipping points. For example, the birth control pill—a scientific advance—created new options and choices for women that brought existing gender social norms into question and opened avenues for empowerment not considered before. Its introduction was met with backlash, and for many years no research was conducted to bring it to use for family planning purposes, as the concept of artificial contraception was unfamiliar or taboo.⁶⁹ For several decades many countries banned prescribing the pill for birth control, and religious institutions declared that artificial birth control was sinful.⁷⁰ It followed a volatile process until its eventual social acceptance and had a tremendous impact on women’s agency, control over their bodies and ability to plan their families and professional lives.⁷¹ Access to a wide range of family planning services and resources has since transformed child and maternal health.⁷²

In some cases policy has played a leading role in changing norms. The international movement towards universal primary and secondary education—adopted and implemented by most countries in the form of free compulsory education up to grade 8—changed the landscape for gender equality in education.⁷³ Even though tertiary education is not compulsory, the norm of educating girls has already shifted, and in most countries more women than men are now in tertiary education.⁷⁴ And countries aiming to expand human development through higher

Box 3 Why are gender social norms so persistent?

Social contexts shape people's attitudes on gender.¹ This insight is consistent with the view of people as encultured agents' whose beliefs and attitudes are shaped by cognitive processes in conjunction with social and material realities.² Gender norms are inculcated in social settings, usually from an early age and especially through parental attitudes.³ As children grow up, they are socialized into the gender norms, expectations and associated behaviours that surround them, drawing from schools, workplaces, religious institutions, media representations of gender and so on.⁴

But internalization of social norms is not inevitable.⁵ The numerous people who challenge social norms and practices through activism and social movements around the world show that regressive gender social norms are often strongly contested. So, socialization only partly explains the persistence of social norms—other social processes also play a role. Institutionalization is one such process. Gender social norms are often embedded in institutional arrangements and social practices.⁶ Discriminatory practices, gendered assignments of responsibilities at home and in the workplace, and gender hierarchies in religious practices can strongly influence behaviours and attitudes even when laws and policies stipulate gender equality.⁷

Like social norms in general, gender social norms are often maintained through social sanctioning, where behaviour abiding with norms is socially rewarded and transgression penalized. Social sanctioning can be powerful enough to cause people to adhere to social norms they do not agree with.⁸ Some women in management positions engage in behaviours that put men at ease, such as showing meekness and refraining from competitive behaviour, to navigate the institutionalized gender dynamics of their workplaces.⁹ These dynamics in turn might reinforce biased attitudes that men make better executives and leaders than women.

That people's attitudes and behaviours depend not only on their own beliefs but also on what they believe about others sheds light on why some gender social norms remain ubiquitous even when they are clearly harmful. Relying on others' attitudes can lead to social norms persisting long after people's actual support for them has diminished.¹⁰ There is evidence that people often underestimate men's support for women's rights.¹¹ In Saudi Arabia a majority of married men privately support women working outside the home but perceive other men's support to be far lower than it actually is.¹²


Some groups or individuals have a vested interest in ensuring that norms upholding gender inequalities persist.¹³ Men and boys often stand to gain from gender norms that perpetuate men's exercise of power over women, such as household decisionmaking. Social elites can institute practices or customs that diminish women's access to resources and power.¹⁴ Biases can be upheld by women as well: wealthier women might preserve norms of withdrawal from the labour force as a sign of social status and respectability.¹⁵ Moreover, biased gender social norms can harm men as well, and men can experience social sanctioning and penalties when they do not conform to norms of masculinity.¹⁶

Socialization, institutionalization and shared normative expectations all unfold in the broader context of longstanding impediments to women's power and agency. The socially oppressive conditions where many women live, learn and work can make it difficult for women themselves to challenge social norms in their own views, attitudes and beliefs. Consider how social taboos and practices of victim-blaming around violence against women and girls might lead women to refrain from reporting violence, due not only to fear of social sanctions but also to internalized self-blame. In contexts where women have long been without power, voice and influence, it can be challenging for women and girls to view themselves as agents of change. Tackling regressive social norms thus depends on defending and expanding women's agency across the board and scrutinizing beliefs that limit that expansion.

Notes

1. Cislighi and Heise 2020; Cislighi, Manji and Heise 2018. 2. UNDP 2022d, pp. 101–103. 3. Tenenbaum and Leaper 2002. 4. Marcus and Harper 2014; Overseas Development Institute 2015. 5. Pearse and Connell 2016. 6. Pearse and Connell 2016; Rao and Kelleher 2003. 7. For instance, Mackie and LeJeune (2009) argue that several factors (such as customs, religious codes, cultural traditions and stereotyping) maintain social norms and that any of these factors can on their own ensure that a norm persists. 8. ODI 2015. 9. Ballakrishnen, Fielding-Singh and Magliozzi 2019; Gherardi and Poggio 2001. 10. People often overestimate how much others support hegemonic gender social norms, leading to what is known as pluralistic ignorance (Bicchieri 2016). 11. Bursztyn and others 2023. 12. Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott 2020. 13. ODI 2015. 14. Agarwal 1994, 1997; Teigen, Midtbøen and Karlsen 2022. 15. Kandiyoti 1988. 16. Amin and others 2018; Kaufman 2014; Rice and others 2021.

Figure 10 The share of people with no bias in gender social norms improved in 27 countries between 2010–2014 and 2017–2022



Note: Includes 38 countries and territories with data from both wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 47 percent of the global population.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations using data from the World Values Survey.

women’s labour force participation do promote greater economic opportunities for women.⁷⁵ Such policies have been more successful where gender social norms allowed women’s participation in the workforce and where women feel safe going to work.

Norms have also shifted through the work of firms and civil society organizations. When Grameen Bank pioneered microfinance in Bangladesh, part of its pro-poor aspiration was to support economically and socially disempowered women.⁷⁶ Access to credit changed gender power roles and dynamics within households.⁷⁷ Because women had high repayment rates, Grameen continued to lend primarily to women.⁷⁸ Today, more than 80 percent of microfinance borrowers across the world are women. By narrowing the gender gap, these micro loans have leveraged women’s economic

empowerment and shaped women’s roles in key ways.⁷⁹ But such finance has not always automatically empowered women, and social contexts remain relevant.⁸⁰

More firms are hiring women in senior executive positions, particularly in some very high HDI countries. For instance, the share of chief executive officers (CEOs) in US Fortune 500 companies who are women reached an all-time high of 10 percent in 2023.⁸¹ In Stoxx Europe 600 companies women account for 16 percent of CEOs and 33 percent of nonexecutive directors.⁸² In 2022 the European Parliament enacted a law requiring 40 percent of nonexecutive directors to be women.⁸³ Women in leadership positions have a catalytic effect, driving more women to have higher professional and education aspirations.⁸⁴ The faces of girls and women in leadership roles—Malala

Yousafzai, Greta Thunberg, Wajeha al-Huwaider—have inspired young girls and women across the world to stand up for issues important to them.

Feminist movements against gender-based violence and femicide—such as Ni Una Menos, I Will Go Out, Me Too and Time’s Up—have led to important social and policy changes too. They have inspired support for women’s legal rights, care work, access to land tenure, financial inclusion, prevention of sexual harassment and greater awareness of violence against women and girls.⁸⁵ These movements have enacted changes through two main pathways: policy reforms and reframing gender roles and power relations.⁸⁶ Countries with a lower presence of women’s movements (as measured by the Feminist Mobilization Index) have the highest biases against gender equality and women’s empowerment (as measured by the GSNI).⁸⁷

In other cases, changing perceptions are opening doors for new policies, as with the rapidly changing landscape on paternity leave. A growing perception that men can participate equally in childcare, especially after childbirth, has led many countries and institutions to allow time for fathers to bond with their newborns while providing support and flexibility to mothers balancing professional commitments and childcare. The New Dad Research Series at Boston College explores some of the early experiences from new paternity policies and how they are shifting attitudes at home and work.⁸⁸

Call to action: towards comprehensive action tackling social norms

Gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls are influenced by a complex interplay of formal and informal social arrangements. Achieving positive outcomes requires not only having formal policies and institutions that enable equal participation in social life but also addressing deep-rooted gender social norms that can undermine genuine equality. Building on the insights from the 2021/2022 Human Development Report,⁸⁹ we propose a comprehensive framework for transformative change, comprising two key blocks of action. The first block aims to shape gender-sensitive policy interventions and institutional reforms, and the second block focuses on the significant role of the social context in shaping attitudes and behaviours (figure 11).

Leveraging gender-responsive policies and institutions


Investing in gender-responsive institutions in public administration at the national and local levels enables governments to be more responsive and accountable and enhances the quality of public services.⁹⁰ Institutions could be more gender-responsive in how they allocate resources. Take Fiji’s Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability framework, which assesses gender-responsive public financing. Promoting work-life balance—including parental leave policies and access to affordable and quality care facilities for civil servants, as in Brazil, Chile and the Dominican Republic—also helps build gender-conscious institutions.⁹¹

“Strengthening social protection and care systems that reach women can serve as insurance, increasing women’s bargaining power at the household level, promoting financial inclusion, supporting long-term income generation and building agency

Strengthening social protection and care systems that reach women can serve as insurance, increasing women’s bargaining power at the household level, promoting financial inclusion, supporting long-term income generation and building agency. Enhanced control over assets can shift power relations and provide insurance in the face of external shocks. For example, in Mexico UNDP is working with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the government of Chiapas to strengthen Tzotzil women’s access to finance and the labour market and is building women’s networks to boost women’s social capital.⁹²

Encouraging innovative interventions can create tipping points for pervasive gender norms. For instance, regulating gender misinformation and disinformation and addressing hate speech and online violence—all influenced by biased gender social norms—can go a long way towards women feeling more in control over their own lives. In the Arab States several civil society organizations supported by UN Women’s HerStory network have established task forces to monitor mass and social media, track misinformation and gender stereotyping and update

Figure 11 Levers of change for gender social norms



Source: Human Development Report Office.

Arabic Wikipedia articles.⁹³ Other innovations include taking advantage of social media to amplify the messages of feminist movements.

Changing the social context to shift gender norms

Changing gender social norms requires interventions that generate the broader social and contextual conditions for gender transformative change to take. This can be advanced through education that strengthens agency and encourages women to shape their own future, recognition that acknowledges women's rights and respect for their identities and representation that amplifies women's power and voice.

The content of education becomes an integral part of overcoming biased gender social norms, which are most often born early in life at home and continue through experiences in school, religious gatherings, social gatherings and other communities, where they may be reinforced or challenged. Education that develops reasoning and critical thinking⁹⁴ plays

a central role in value and belief formation. It can also provide understanding of the existence of social norms and how they manifest, which can in turn help in overcoming norms and stereotypes that harm well-being and agency.

Tackling prejudices and encouraging positive gender norms can be an important part of education curricula and social behaviour in schools. For example, the Rapantaran programme developed in Nepal helps adolescent girls find their voice and exercise their agency through training in social and financial skills, while educating their parents and caregivers to create a safe, protective and enabling environment for girls' education.⁹⁵ Other practices include correcting fundamental biases in gender social norms in education materials and curricula,⁹⁶ challenging the media representation of women as well as of men and their masculinity and providing information and opportunities in nonstereotyped careers for young women and men. In Nigeria the nongovernmental organization Empowering Women for Excellence Initiative is implementing the Civic Education and Participation for

Women Project to address the underrepresentation of women and excluded groups in political spaces.⁹⁷

Recognition can be leveraged through legal changes that uphold equal rights for women in all spheres of life. Social recognition can be enhanced through communication and mass media campaigns that change narratives on gender social norms, acknowledging how they impede progress. In Jordan the United Nations launched a new game app called WeRise that uses competitions, word puzzles and other games to highlight young people's important role in promoting gender equality and equal rights and voices.⁹⁸ Going forward, media could focus on women as potential leaders and key decisionmakers in societies. Scripts that place value where it should be, rather than on gender, can alter how people think when they are taking decisions in voting booths, board rooms and interview panels. Bringing educated and experienced women into key decisionmaking roles could be a game-changer in development.

“Social norms that impair women’s voice and participation are not only detrimental to women themselves but also to society more broadly

Legal and policy actions need to be taken to prevent, respond to and raise awareness of the increased violence against women in politics. Bolivia criminalized political violence and harassment against women in 2012; this inspired similar legislation in Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Peru.⁹⁹ Modelling positive masculinity and behaviours is highly relevant for efforts to prevent violence. Program H, piloted in Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica and Peru and now expanded to 32 countries, engages young men in critical reflections about manhood.¹⁰⁰

Representation of women in public spaces, institutions, governance processes and leadership positions can change stereotypes and support changes in laws and policies defending women's rights. Strengthening women's voice and decisionmaking roles in deliberations can shift discussions, revealing alternative paths not otherwise considered. Higher women's representation in parliament brings new agendas to the table, including gender-sensitive laws.¹⁰¹ In Uganda the Women's Democracy Group implemented two mentoring programs to form women's caucuses, strengthen women's influence in leadership and decisionmaking and draw action plans for gender responsiveness and political accountability.¹⁰²

When women are CEOs and represented in boardrooms, there have been positive changes in the use of language in companies.¹⁰³ Women leaders have been strong and capable while responding to and accommodating employees' needs.¹⁰⁴ Women's representation in decisionmaking stands as a right for women leaders, as well as more broadly for all women and their rights.

* * *

As demonstrated in this report, social norms that impair women's voice and participation are not only detrimental to women themselves but also to society more broadly. When women exercise agency, communities at large stand to gain.¹⁰⁵ Social norms working against women's agency close societies off to this enrichment—through development paths not taken, opportunities not grasped, potential that could not be reached. Biases against women are sustained by social arrangements and practices, and addressing them depends greatly on social change at large—and particularly on enhancing human agency.

Notes

- 1 UNICEF 2022a. See also Psaki, McCarthy and Mensch (2018).
- 2 HDRO calculations based on IPU and UN Women (2023).
- 3 UN Women and UNDESA 2022.
- 4 See Bergsten and Lee (2023), Biroli and Caminotti (2020) and Roggeband and Krizsán (2020).
- 5 See UNDP (2020a) for the definitions of basic and enhanced capabilities for women.
- 6 Our World in Data 2021a, 2021b.
- 7 See dashboard 2 in UNDP (2022b).
- 8 HDRO calculations based on IPU and UN Women (2023).
- 9 A central tenet of human development, agency is the ability for an individual to make choices based on what he or she values and has reason to value. For women agency encompasses the full range of capabilities to make choices they value—in determining everyday roles in their households, in running for political office or in exercising their reproductive choices. Social norms shape the conditions in which people make choices and thus have a special bearing on agency.
- 10 Based on data from wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey.
- 11 For a review of how gender norms influence women's engagement in politics, see George (2020).
- 12 The first edition of the GSNI was based on data for 2010–2014. See UNDP (2020a).
- 13 IPU and UN Women 2023; UN Women 2023.
- 14 UN Women 2023.
- 15 ILO 2022.
- 16 See dashboard 3 in UNDP (2022b).
- 17 WHO 2009.
- 18 UNICEF 2022b.
- 19 WHO 2009.
- 20 Wellbeing achievement is the objective state of wellbeing, such as being educated or being employed, while wellbeing freedoms refer to the freedom to achieve wellbeing, or the “advantage” of a person in pursuing or obtaining wellbeing (Sen 2017). For example, Afghan women today are not allowed to enrol in tertiary education, even if they want to. This impedes their wellbeing freedom and then might translate into the absence of that wellbeing achievement.
- 21 Sen 2017.
- 22 The female enrolment in tertiary education worldwide tripled between 1995 and 2018 (UNESCO IESALC 2021).
- 23 UNESCO 2020.
- 24 UNDP 2022d.
- 25 Bertrand 2020; Blair and Posmanick 2023; Blau and Kahn 2000; Duflo 2012; Goldin 2014.
- 26 England, Levine and Mishel 2020; Kochhar 2023.
- 27 Bertrand 2020; Blair and Posmanick 2023.
- 28 Tinsley and Ely 2018.
- 29 ILO 2022; UNDP 2021.
- 30 Our World in Data 2021a, 2021b.
- 31 IPU and UN Women 2023.
- 32 UN Women 2023.
- 33 HDRO calculations based on IPU and UN Women 2023.
- 34 Schwanke 2013; Weyer 2007.
- 35 Rudman and others 2012.
- 36 O'Neill, Estes and Hartmann 2015.
- 37 Gorokhovskaia, Shahbaz and Slipowitz 2023; Papada and others 2023.
- 38 UNDP 2022d.
- 39 OHCHR 2022.
- 40 UNDP 2020a.
- 41 UNDP 2022a.
- 42 United Nations General Assembly 1949.
- 43 UN Women and UNDP 2022.
- 44 Funk and Philips 2019.
- 45 Diebolt and Perrin 2013.
- 46 McKinsey & Company and UNDP 2017.
- 47 Thöni and Volk 2021.
- 48 Taub 2020.
- 49 Batson, Gupta and Barry 2021; WHO 2019.
- 50 UN Security Council 2021.
- 51 Council on Foreign Relations 2023b.
- 52 Council on Foreign Relations 2023b.
- 53 UN Security Council 2021.
- 54 Jolly 1990; Paffenholz 2018.
- 55 Paffenholz and others 2016.
- 56 UN Security Council 2000.
- 57 Krause, Krause and Bränfors 2018.
- 58 Council on Foreign Relations 2023a.
- 59 Stone 2014.
- 60 Hudson and others 2009.
- 61 See <https://www.womanstats.org/>.
- 62 Cohen and Karim 2022.
- 63 Hudson and others (2012), based on a comparison of gender-based violence and state peacefulness data.
- 64 Prentice and Paluck 2020.
- 65 Legros and Cislighi 2020.
- 66 Ehret and others 2022.
- 67 The increase in the share of people with no bias is statistically significant for 16 countries.
- 68 The decrease in the share of people with no bias is statistically significant for 7 countries.
- 69 Liao and Dollin 2012.
- 70 Liao and Dollin 2012.
- 71 Asbell 1995.
- 72 Gipson, Koenig and Hindin 2008; UNDESA 2022.
- 73 Article 13 in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 (OHCHR 1966) details the right to education that is free of discrimination of any kind, including gender.
- 74 See dashboard 2 in UNDP (2022b).
- 75 Loko and Diouf 2009.
- 76 Grameen Foundation 2023.
- 77 Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 1996.
- 78 Zainuddin and Yasin 2020.
- 79 Pomeranz 2014.
- 80 Kabeer 2005.
- 81 Hinchliffe 2023.
- 82 EWOB 2019.
- 83 European Parliament 2022.
- 84 Beaman and others 2012.
- 85 Sahay 2021; UN Women and UNDP 2022; Weldon and others 2018.
- 86 Jimenez, Harper and George 2021.
- 87 UNDP 2022d.
- 88 See <https://www.bc.edu/content/bc-web/schools/carroll-school/sites/center-for-work-family/research/work-life-flexibility1.html> (accessed 15 February 2023).
- 89 UNDP 2022d.
- 90 UNDP 2021.

91 UNDP 2020b; Zrinskita, Raappana and Rame 2021.

92 UNDP 2022c, 2023.

93 UN Women 2021.

94 UNDP 2022d.

95 UNICEF 2021.

96 Council of Europe 2014; Orfan 2021; Vu and Pham 2021.

97 EWEI 2023.

98 United Nations 2022.

99 Brechenmacher 2017; Restrepo Sanín 2022.

100 Equimundo 2023; The Prevention Collaborative 2018.

101 Asiedu and others 2018; Devlin and Elgie 2008; Fokum, Fonjong and Adams 2020.

102 Commonwealth Women in Local Government Network 2021.

103 Lawson and others 2022.

104 Lawson and others 2022.

105 Sen 2005.

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TABLE A1

Gender Social Norms Index, latest available period

Country or territory	Period	Share of people biased by dimension						
		GSNI (share of people with at least one bias)	GSNI2 (share of people with at least two biases)	Share of people with no bias	Political	Educational	Economic	Physical integrity
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Countries with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) or wave 7 (2017–2022)								
Algeria	2010-2014	98.39	88.83	1.61	83.15	38.51	76.32	91.45
Andorra	2017-2022	42.46	15.49	57.54	23.65	2.60	15.90	20.76
Argentina	2017-2022	71.93	35.03	28.07	34.68	13.85	25.03	57.74
Armenia	2017-2022	91.94	72.75	8.06	58.23	18.32	68.09	65.88
Australia	2017-2022	34.83	15.41	65.17	23.27	2.62	13.32	17.17
Azerbaijan	2010-2014	98.70	92.38	1.30	83.98	30.24	90.90	70.06
Bangladesh	2017-2022	99.37	91.67	0.63	68.84	44.46	88.07	87.83
Belarus	2010-2014	89.93	71.70	10.07	78.33	21.42	58.64	55.38
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2017-2022	90.90	57.11	9.10	38.55	21.95	37.97	82.06
Brazil	2017-2022	84.45	47.42	15.55	39.91	9.75	31.06	75.69
Canada	2017-2022	41.14	20.71	58.86	27.87	7.02	16.25	24.24
Chile	2017-2022	79.74	52.39	20.26	59.03	24.32	35.88	55.53
China	2017-2022	91.81	68.42	8.19	57.80	21.07	56.49	74.44
Colombia	2017-2022	91.18	59.01	8.82	54.14	18.16	28.16	81.58
Cyprus	2017-2022	80.48	57.86	19.52	49.03	15.82	52.74	57.59
Czechia	2017-2022	77.69	59.26	22.31	63.54	25.15	49.91	43.03
Ecuador	2017-2022	92.09	61.86	7.91	51.92	22.29	38.65	80.83
Egypt	2017-2022	99.52	94.77	0.48	88.79	30.51	93.80	90.28
Estonia	2010-2014	76.77	52.09	23.23	58.82	16.77	46.97	37.55
Ethiopia	2017-2022	98.77	73.75	1.23	45.03	16.09	61.73	95.18
Georgia	2010-2014	94.43	78.11	5.57	68.06	18.30	67.97	76.32
Germany	2017-2022	37.45	13.27	62.55	13.18	4.21	15.37	23.06
Ghana	2010-2014	98.97	91.43	1.03	84.47	27.58	76.55	90.34
Greece	2017-2022	64.00	35.91	36.00	29.34	7.86	46.48	30.56
Guatemala	2017-2022	89.46	56.78	10.54	59.55	15.76	28.77	76.06
Haiti*	2010-2014	98.91	92.76	1.09	76.13	60.00	72.09	88.11
Hong Kong, China (SAR)	2017-2022	80.59	55.36	19.41	50.37	18.48	42.28	59.07
India	2010-2014	99.22	86.26	0.78	68.91	38.50	75.09	92.39
Indonesia	2017-2022	99.65	93.39	0.35	77.90	43.97	84.26	94.08
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	2017-2022	95.47	82.09	4.53	67.37	47.37	77.50	67.20
Iraq	2017-2022	98.98	93.03	1.02	84.09	31.58	87.32	87.42
Japan	2017-2022	58.82	34.54	41.18	39.07	14.49	37.03	24.58
Jordan	2017-2022	98.46	92.30	1.54	84.03	24.46	87.41	81.35
Kazakhstan	2017-2022	93.23	76.44	6.77	68.41	28.65	66.18	72.56
Kenya	2017-2022	95.49	81.87	4.51	73.07	18.18	50.76	85.51
Korea (Republic of)	2017-2022	89.88	75.10	10.12	72.85	33.73	65.54	59.20
Kuwait	2010-2014	98.47	93.23	1.53	91.28	37.61	78.57	85.51
Kyrgyzstan	2017-2022	98.02	89.46	1.98	78.81	52.18	83.39	90.18
Lebanon	2017-2022	95.49	78.57	4.51	66.92	15.16	67.95	83.78
Libya	2017-2022	99.72	90.83	0.28	83.03	30.89	82.43	92.93
Malaysia	2017-2022	99.54	87.50	0.46	91.72	36.10	59.79	84.62
Maldives	2017-2022	94.69	78.14	5.31	71.98	14.98	66.15	75.75
Mexico	2017-2022	90.09	59.52	9.91	58.01	18.75	32.87	72.83
Mongolia	2017-2022	97.44	84.92	2.56	74.18	31.62	66.73	80.16
Morocco	2017-2022	93.67	75.08	6.33	61.92	20.42	63.42	79.67
Myanmar	2017-2022	99.42	92.49	0.58	74.50	52.50	89.17	94.49
Netherlands	2017-2022	30.64	11.16	69.36	20.76	3.25	7.96	17.69
New Zealand	2017-2022	27.39	8.67	72.61	14.78	2.83	9.32	14.37
Nicaragua	2017-2022	93.17	57.58	6.83	44.08	20.92	34.33	86.00
Nigeria	2017-2022	99.58	93.14	0.42	86.18	41.78	79.92	89.98
Pakistan	2017-2022	99.89	98.52	0.11	85.72	60.38	92.18	92.00
Palestine, State of	2010-2014	98.08	93.61	1.92	90.51	26.97	80.72	84.08
Peru	2017-2022	88.50	50.00	11.50	40.71	14.32	32.26	76.33
Philippines	2017-2022	99.50	90.44	0.50	75.50	43.61	77.81	92.83
Poland	2010-2014	80.43	50.41	19.57	48.80	12.35	44.41	55.04
Qatar	2010-2014	99.81	95.10	0.19	91.62	27.45	81.74	87.48
Romania	2017-2022	85.84	61.75	14.16	51.71	19.92	53.49	62.05
Russian Federation	2017-2022	90.68	74.61	9.32	70.85	27.65	67.77	56.96
Rwanda	2010-2014	99.15	89.39	0.85	67.78	36.15	65.68	97.64
Serbia	2017-2022	76.11	45.11	23.89	45.49	10.79	30.57	54.16
Singapore	2017-2022	77.14	49.87	22.86	49.97	17.46	37.94	56.07
Slovakia	2017-2022	86.53	68.27	13.47	62.06	32.91	60.02	51.93

Continued –

TABLE A1

Country or territory	Period	Share of people biased by dimension						
		GSNI (share of people with at least one bias)	GSNI2 (share of people with at least two biases)	Share of people with no bias	Political	Educational	Economic	Physical integrity
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Slovenia	2010-2014	58.77	28.18	41.23	34.72	8.38	26.13	30.91
South Africa	2010-2014	97.39	83.12	2.61	77.51	38.40	57.00	89.78
Spain	2010-2014	50.74	26.01	49.26	30.61	11.71	20.18	29.23
Sweden	2010-2014	27.91	9.91	72.09	15.77	2.60	8.91	14.31
Tajikistan	2017-2022	99.92	87.42	0.08	78.33	51.67	78.08	97.50
Thailand	2017-2022	95.80	80.17	4.20	68.54	33.17	56.42	81.04
Trinidad and Tobago	2010-2014	86.44	51.45	13.56	41.34	5.66	37.51	74.02
Tunisia	2017-2022	96.68	84.26	3.32	83.49	24.92	71.15	77.08
Türkiye	2017-2022	91.08	77.34	8.92	70.02	32.68	65.65	75.57
Ukraine	2017-2022	84.21	65.55	15.79	56.51	24.77	55.89	61.82
United Kingdom ^b	2017-2022	29.60	9.35	70.40	20.86	2.71	10.37	8.23
United States	2017-2022	50.22	26.15	49.78	35.31	8.62	13.90	30.78
Uruguay	2017-2022	60.78	22.36	39.22	31.57	5.24	18.24	44.34
Uzbekistan	2010-2014	98.03	88.17	1.97	80.08	49.02	81.19	84.18
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	2017-2022	92.35	60.84	7.65	55.80	17.90	31.01	80.84
Viet Nam	2017-2022	93.80	75.04	6.20	65.53	27.67	64.33	77.75
Yemen	2010-2014	98.36	93.70	1.64	89.48	47.38	88.82	84.19
Zimbabwe	2017-2022	98.62	78.25	1.38	62.17	14.32	55.39	95.62
Overall average ^c	Latest available	88.69	70.70	11.31	61.23	28.07	59.62	74.70
Countries with data from wave 5 (2005-2009)								
Bulgaria	2005-2009	76.37	43.30	23.63	55.49	11.29	37.33	41.33
Burkina Faso	2005-2009	98.71	85.87	1.29	68.67	34.75	80.18	90.91
Finland	2005-2009	51.63	23.08	48.37	25.56	6.87	24.29	30.19
France	2005-2009	56.47	27.87	43.53	36.34	6.93	26.21	22.95
Hungary	2005-2009	67.23	41.67	32.77	44.29	19.16	39.85	31.53
Italy ^d	2005-2009	61.58	27.59	38.42	19.24	8.02	29.72	45.50
Mali	2005-2009	99.63	95.06	0.37	84.71	49.59	90.95	92.93
Moldova (Republic of)	2005-2009	90.05	67.43	9.95	61.23	16.91	60.04	66.80
Norway	2005-2009	40.93	15.70	59.07	19.48	3.73	22.07	16.77
Switzerland	2005-2009	54.86	25.90	45.14	21.40	8.82	29.38	29.51
Zambia	2005-2009	97.28	81.71	2.72	67.78	24.31	56.85	90.35

Notes

- a Data refer to 2015/16.
- b Excludes Northern Ireland, per the World Values Survey data. Based on the six indicators in the original database. See *Technical note* at <https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-gender-social-norms-index-gsni> for details.
- c Weighted based on the population ages 15 and older from UNDESA (2022) for the 80 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) or wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 85 percent of the world population.
- d Based on the six indicators in the original database. See *Technical note* at <https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-gender-social-norms-index-gsni> for details.

Definitions

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index 2 (GSNI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among seven indicators.

Share of people with no bias: Percentage of people with zero biases among seven indicators.

Share of people biased by dimension: Percentage of people with bias for the dimension (regardless of the number of biases among component indicators).

Main data sources

Columns 1–7: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022, accessed 12 January 2023).

TABLE A2

Gender Social Norms Index, latest available period by gender

Country or territory	Period	Share of people biased by dimension													
		GSNI (share of people with at least one bias)		GSNI2 (share of people with at least two biases)		Share of people with no bias		Political		Educational		Economic		Physical integrity	
		Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Countries with data from wave 6 (2010-2014) or wave 7 (2017-2022)															
Algeria	2010-2014	96.94	99.79	80.35	97.04	3.06	0.21	72.87	92.79	29.66	47.40	63.85	88.25	88.12	94.88
Andorra	2017-2022	40.71	44.15	13.36	17.54	59.29	55.85	23.30	24.00	2.83	2.37	11.16	20.51	20.98	20.55
Argentina	2017-2022	69.71	74.33	31.85	38.50	30.29	25.67	29.90	39.74	12.48	15.30	19.80	30.75	58.66	56.77
Armenia	2017-2022	90.42	95.27	68.42	82.25	9.58	4.73	54.66	66.02	15.93	23.56	64.21	76.41	60.27	78.38
Australia	2017-2022	29.05	43.26	9.98	23.41	70.95	56.74	19.85	28.55	1.48	4.42	7.41	22.27	14.65	20.78
Azerbaijan	2010-2014	97.59	99.80	86.92	97.80	2.41	0.20	76.31	91.62	21.96	38.52	87.00	94.80	60.28	79.84
Bangladesh	2017-2022	99.10	99.63	90.50	92.86	0.90	0.37	66.38	71.33	42.42	46.57	86.94	89.22	85.53	90.20
Belarus	2010-2014	86.23	94.47	61.26	84.52	13.77	5.53	73.23	84.62	13.71	30.89	46.79	73.22	48.05	64.51
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2017-2022	89.75	92.03	54.02	60.14	10.25	7.97	34.07	42.99	19.77	24.16	34.06	41.91	81.96	82.16
Brazil	2017-2022	84.17	84.78	43.09	52.66	15.83	15.22	38.32	41.81	7.23	12.85	24.95	38.42	75.79	75.56
Canada	2017-2022	34.00	47.94	13.63	27.44	66.00	52.06	24.55	31.03	2.71	11.12	7.40	24.67	17.51	30.65
Chile	2017-2022	76.39	83.41	45.88	59.51	23.61	16.59	51.99	66.82	20.32	28.79	27.70	44.90	56.00	55.02
China	2017-2022	90.04	93.97	63.61	74.30	9.96	6.03	54.57	61.76	19.33	23.19	52.52	61.32	72.63	76.66
Colombia	2017-2022	92.76	89.61	58.29	59.74	7.24	10.39	56.05	52.24	15.79	20.53	22.89	33.42	82.11	81.05
Cyprus	2017-2022	77.50	83.75	52.27	64.00	22.50	16.25	44.65	53.69	13.73	18.09	43.97	62.09	57.87	57.27
Czechia	2017-2022	71.10	85.52	48.54	72.01	28.90	14.48	54.60	74.11	19.28	32.10	38.13	63.75	38.16	48.72
Ecuador	2017-2022	91.41	92.83	59.60	64.34	8.59	7.17	50.25	53.76	19.19	25.66	32.48	45.47	81.04	80.60
Egypt	2017-2022	99.16	99.82	91.82	97.30	0.84	0.18	84.74	92.25	24.73	35.83	90.04	97.24	88.79	91.67
Estonia	2010-2014	72.87	82.00	46.01	60.25	27.13	18.00	53.72	65.17	14.49	19.66	39.46	56.49	33.21	43.25
Ethiopia	2017-2022	98.73	98.81	72.00	75.38	1.27	1.19	43.24	46.71	14.74	17.42	58.87	64.52	94.54	95.81
Georgia	2010-2014	93.06	95.97	72.23	84.75	6.94	4.03	63.96	72.64	16.95	19.89	61.94	75.00	72.41	80.97
Germany	2017-2022	33.06	42.12	9.96	16.79	66.94	57.88	10.70	15.79	3.19	5.29	11.71	19.23	21.42	24.79
Ghana	2010-2014	98.83	99.10	87.18	95.64	1.17	0.90	79.92	88.97	19.56	35.51	67.10	85.90	89.77	90.90
Greece	2017-2022	55.21	73.98	24.27	49.13	44.79	26.02	20.16	39.85	6.51	9.40	36.70	57.65	27.20	34.36
Guatemala	2017-2022	88.82	90.16	52.47	61.57	11.18	9.84	56.62	62.81	13.41	18.41	23.08	35.15	75.39	76.81
Haiti ^a	2010-2014	97.95	99.89	86.17	99.58	2.05	0.11	72.53	79.81	43.34	77.37	50.94	94.29	81.29	95.09
Hong Kong, China (SAR)	2017-2022	78.43	83.14	50.18	61.44	21.57	16.86	47.33	53.94	14.72	22.92	36.74	48.79	56.80	61.76
India	2010-2014	98.88	99.45	80.75	90.03	1.12	0.55	61.95	73.96	34.91	41.18	67.87	80.38	92.43	92.36
Indonesia	2017-2022	99.71	99.58	93.24	93.57	0.29	0.42	77.35	78.58	40.82	47.79	83.66	84.98	94.40	93.69
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	2017-2022	93.67	97.24	76.79	87.29	6.33	2.76	62.45	72.16	36.54	57.80	73.14	81.70	62.07	72.14
Iraq	2017-2022	98.12	99.83	90.41	95.62	1.88	0.17	78.95	89.15	26.35	36.69	85.01	89.57	88.34	86.51
Japan	2017-2022	54.44	64.17	31.21	38.61	45.56	35.83	36.48	42.20	12.56	17.10	34.87	39.96	20.55	29.64
Jordan	2017-2022	98.10	98.81	89.83	94.74	1.90	1.19	81.85	86.17	18.79	30.03	84.34	90.41	77.70	84.93
Kazakhstan	2017-2022	91.26	95.68	71.40	82.73	8.74	4.32	62.82	75.29	25.41	32.56	60.84	72.61	67.90	78.48
Kenya	2017-2022	94.54	96.39	78.87	84.68	5.46	3.61	71.04	74.88	16.61	19.87	43.32	58.03	85.62	85.25
Korea (Republic of)	2017-2022	86.83	93.08	70.06	80.40	13.17	6.92	68.81	77.10	30.41	37.23	59.40	71.99	56.11	62.44
Kuwait	2010-2014	96.57	99.43	85.49	97.17	3.43	0.57	82.28	95.92	29.48	41.61	62.79	86.64	87.39	84.95
Kyrgyzstan	2017-2022	97.44	98.99	88.12	91.71	2.56	1.01	77.54	80.91	48.04	58.94	81.40	86.64	88.53	92.96
Lebanon	2017-2022	93.07	97.95	71.45	85.79	6.93	2.05	58.22	75.63	13.69	16.64	58.36	77.61	83.81	83.75
Libya	2017-2022	99.44	100.00	85.69	95.81	0.56	0.00	74.87	90.67	20.91	40.26	74.65	89.67	91.61	94.20
Malaysia	2017-2022	99.69	99.39	84.66	90.34	0.31	0.61	89.42	94.02	28.81	43.38	48.93	70.62	85.06	84.17
Maldives	2017-2022	93.70	95.73	74.21	82.26	6.30	4.27	67.64	76.53	12.41	17.98	60.52	72.28	75.23	76.75
Mexico	2017-2022	88.89	91.27	58.49	60.53	11.11	8.73	56.87	59.13	19.77	17.74	31.27	34.45	71.80	73.86
Mongolia	2017-2022	97.40	97.47	82.98	86.99	2.60	2.53	71.04	77.53	28.25	35.23	64.78	68.81	81.09	79.17
Morocco	2017-2022	90.83	96.50	68.83	81.33	9.17	3.50	54.00	69.83	19.33	21.50	56.67	70.17	77.67	81.67
Myanmar	2017-2022	99.67	99.17	92.15	92.82	0.33	0.83	76.13	72.88	49.08	55.91	88.15	90.18	94.82	94.16
Netherlands	2017-2022	27.21	34.41	7.66	15.01	72.79	65.59	20.00	21.59	1.97	4.76	4.91	11.57	13.64	22.22
New Zealand	2017-2022	23.16	32.73	5.63	12.42	76.84	67.27	12.60	17.72	1.76	4.47	7.68	10.75	11.45	18.49
Nicaragua	2017-2022	92.80	93.55	55.48	59.76	7.20	6.45	42.88	45.33	20.29	21.56	31.75	37.01	86.74	85.23
Nigeria	2017-2022	99.13	100.00	89.02	97.03	0.87	0.00	80.41	91.63	33.72	49.52	70.92	88.48	90.13	89.83
Pakistan	2017-2022	100.00	99.79	98.35	98.65	0.00	0.21	78.67	92.00	52.33	67.84	90.12	94.05	94.05	90.25
Palestine, State of	2010-2014	97.25	98.93	90.25	97.00	2.75	1.07	86.85	94.17	18.93	35.40	72.95	88.87	81.46	86.85
Peru	2017-2022	88.03	88.96	44.72	55.07	11.97	11.04	36.45	44.87	14.10	14.53	26.70	37.72	76.44	76.23
Philippines	2017-2022	99.67	99.33	89.80	91.09	0.33	0.67	72.95	78.06	38.90	48.33	74.79	80.83	92.50	93.16
Poland	2010-2014	78.73	82.57	48.66	52.60	21.27	17.43	44.49	53.97	9.98	15.17	43.22	45.84	55.82	54.11
Qatar	2010-2014	99.82	99.79	94.49	95.82	0.18	0.21	89.93	93.60	27.80	27.05	80.56	83.13	86.32	88.84
Romania	2017-2022	82.15	91.65	54.66	72.91	17.85	8.35	46.04	60.22	17.98	22.82	48.39	61.18	59.97	65.35
Russian Federation	2017-2022	87.02	96.02	68.00	84.25	12.98	3.98	66.23	77.36	25.38	30.98	60.81	77.59	51.35	65.19
Rwanda	2010-2014	99.22	99.08	89.22	89.56	0.78	0.92	67.92	67.64	36.36	35.93	60.91	70.54	97.66	97.62
Serbia	2017-2022	68.58	84.38	37.79	53.15	31.42	15.62	40.96	50.45	8.88	12.89	19.20	43.16	49.31	59.44

Continued –

TABLE A2

Country or territory	Period	Share of people biased by dimension													
		GSNI (share of people with at least one bias)		GSNI2 (share of people with at least two biases)		Share of people with no bias		Political		Educational		Economic		Physical integrity	
		Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)
Singapore	2017-2022	76.59	77.78	47.12	53.06	23.41	22.22	48.89	51.23	14.56	20.87	33.95	42.64	56.29	55.81
Slovakia	2017-2022	81.90	91.87	60.52	77.18	18.10	8.13	52.47	73.23	30.06	36.25	50.40	71.14	50.08	54.11
Slovenia	2010-2014	53.28	66.58	21.58	37.40	46.72	33.42	30.57	40.10	5.25	12.73	19.86	34.74	27.52	35.65
South Africa	2010-2014	96.57	98.23	78.93	87.39	3.43	1.77	73.56	81.50	36.98	39.83	52.18	61.85	88.95	90.63
Spain	2010-2014	49.23	52.32	24.04	28.08	50.77	47.68	28.67	32.60	11.69	11.73	17.48	23.05	29.48	28.96
Sweden	2010-2014	26.57	29.47	7.45	12.77	73.43	70.53	14.29	17.47	1.42	3.93	6.36	11.82	13.18	15.57
Tajikistan	2017-2022	99.83	100.00	83.50	91.41	0.17	0.00	74.59	82.15	47.36	56.06	71.29	85.02	98.35	96.63
Thailand	2017-2022	95.18	96.43	78.46	82.00	4.82	3.57	66.15	70.98	30.61	36.05	53.97	59.20	82.25	79.86
Trinidad and Tobago	2010-2014	84.72	88.45	44.72	59.32	15.28	11.55	37.76	45.48	4.23	7.40	30.43	46.12	73.77	74.31
Tunisia	2017-2022	95.08	98.53	79.84	89.36	4.92	1.47	79.40	88.20	19.31	31.47	64.16	79.28	73.72	81.01
Türkiye	2017-2022	88.45	93.65	71.42	83.12	11.55	6.35	64.20	75.79	30.04	35.34	59.42	71.85	75.00	76.14
Ukraine	2017-2022	80.91	89.19	58.85	75.68	19.09	10.81	50.23	65.63	23.72	26.36	49.33	65.84	58.38	67.05
United Kingdom ^b	2017-2022	27.15	32.35	6.90	12.68	72.85	67.65	19.40	22.36	2.40	3.12	7.18	14.87	7.57	8.97
United States	2017-2022	50.69	49.81	25.04	27.10	49.31	50.19	37.78	33.19	6.99	10.04	9.96	17.32	30.97	30.61
Uruguay	2017-2022	60.20	62.03	21.18	24.89	39.80	37.97	32.45	29.66	3.91	8.11	16.01	23.10	43.48	46.20
Uzbekistan	2010-2014	97.68	98.57	84.69	93.55	2.32	1.43	76.23	86.06	44.35	56.42	77.55	86.82	80.85	89.45
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	2017-2022	91.28	93.52	55.90	66.20	8.72	6.48	52.02	59.89	13.89	22.24	23.59	39.05	79.97	81.79
Viet Nam	2017-2022	93.14	94.60	70.83	80.07	6.86	5.40	61.00	70.95	23.36	32.84	59.69	69.91	76.34	79.45
Yemen	2010-2014	97.26	99.49	89.78	97.71	2.74	0.51	83.33	95.68	41.21	53.56	81.33	96.06	78.33	90.24
Zimbabwe	2017-2022	98.80	98.44	74.87	81.66	1.20	1.56	58.35	66.04	11.42	17.31	48.03	62.92	95.92	95.33
Overall average ^c	Latest available	87.35	90.18	66.53	74.98	12.65	9.82	57.34	65.07	24.93	31.23	54.50	64.74	73.36	76.23
Countries with data from wave 5 (2005-2009)															
Bulgaria	2005-2009	67.22	87.19	31.13	57.66	32.78	12.81	46.30	65.87	9.46	13.44	24.40	52.91	34.53	49.52
Burkina Faso	2005-2009	98.31	99.03	79.32	91.59	1.69	0.97	63.85	73.31	29.43	39.92	75.78	84.23	89.34	92.37
Finland	2005-2009	45.69	58.22	18.04	28.67	54.31	41.78	21.29	30.13	6.14	7.66	18.48	30.59	26.10	34.66
France	2005-2009	56.19	56.77	25.15	30.79	43.81	43.23	34.73	38.06	5.42	8.56	25.78	26.68	21.54	24.48
Hungary	2005-2009	62.58	72.73	32.85	52.09	37.42	27.27	37.86	51.82	17.46	21.15	34.52	46.00	28.57	34.95
Italy ^d	2005-2009	57.95	65.39	22.05	33.41	42.05	34.61	12.55	26.07	7.21	8.85	24.31	35.21	47.14	43.82
Mali	2005-2009	99.26	100.00	92.21	97.83	0.74	0.00	79.85	89.42	45.43	53.75	87.71	94.12	91.73	94.08
Moldova (Republic of)	2005-2009	88.48	91.74	58.79	76.74	11.52	8.26	54.77	68.26	12.82	21.47	53.36	67.50	62.88	71.13
Norway	2005-2009	38.37	43.46	12.45	18.91	61.63	56.54	18.92	20.04	2.76	4.68	17.39	26.72	16.20	17.32
Switzerland	2005-2009	54.02	55.86	24.63	27.44	45.98	44.14	24.92	17.16	6.03	12.29	30.66	27.80	25.61	34.27
Zambia	2005-2009	95.85	98.63	76.71	86.47	4.15	1.37	61.87	73.50	20.70	27.82	48.90	64.58	88.72	91.94

Notes

- a Data refer to 2015/16.
- b Excludes Northern Ireland, per the World Values Survey data. Based on the six indicators in the original database. See *Technical note* at <https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-gender-social-norms-index-gsni> for details.
- c Weighted based on the population ages 15 and older from UNDESA (2022) for the 80 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) or wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 85 percent of the world population.
- d Based on the six indicators in the original database. See *Technical note* at <https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-gender-social-norms-index-gsni> for details.

Definitions

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index 2 (GSNI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among seven indicators.

Share of people with no bias: Percentage of people with zero biases among seven indicators.

Share of people biased by dimension: Percentage of people with bias for the dimension (regardless of the number of biases among component indicators).

Main data sources

Columns 1–14: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022, accessed 12 January 2023).

Continued –

TABLE A3a

Gender Social Norms Index, trends

Country or territory	Share of people biased by dimension													
	GSNI (share of people with at least one bias)		GSNI2 (share of people with at least two biases)		Share of people with no bias		Political		Educational		Economic		Physical integrity	
	2010-2014 (%)	2017-2022 (%)	2010-2014 (%)	2017-2022 (%)	2010-2014 (%)	2017-2022 (%)	2010-2014 (%)	2017-2022 (%)	2010-2014 (%)	2017-2022 (%)	2010-2014 (%)	2017-2022 (%)	2010-2014 (%)	2017-2022 (%)
Argentina	71.08	71.93	39.81	35.03	28.92	28.07	42.00	34.68	16.57	13.85	29.13	25.03	51.96	57.74
Armenia	94.52	91.94	80.34	72.75	5.48	8.06	71.50	58.23	23.67	18.32	74.81	68.09	67.34	65.88
Australia	44.22	34.83	22.18	15.41	55.78	65.17	30.59	23.27	4.58	2.62	18.67	13.32	20.78	17.17
Brazil	89.80	84.45	51.16	47.42	10.20	15.55	43.41	39.91	9.40	9.75	35.41	31.06	79.54	75.69
Chile	74.22	79.74	42.45	52.39	25.78	20.26	43.21	59.03	20.87	24.32	29.13	35.88	54.22	55.53
China	92.84	91.81	71.42	68.42	7.16	8.19	61.53	57.80	24.35	21.07	57.75	56.49	79.06	74.44
Colombia	91.55	91.18	57.46	59.01	8.45	8.82	50.28	54.14	10.83	18.16	33.78	28.16	82.80	81.58
Cyprus	81.64	80.48	53.35	57.86	18.36	19.52	51.40	49.03	14.47	15.82	45.39	52.74	54.14	57.59
Ecuador	93.37	92.09	58.77	61.86	6.63	7.91	46.44	51.92	23.52	22.29	36.42	38.65	84.36	80.83
Germany	57.57	37.45	28.44	13.27	42.43	62.55	22.59	13.18	13.62	4.21	28.84	15.37	40.25	23.06
Hong Kong, China (SAR)	87.72	80.59	59.09	55.36	12.28	19.41	52.27	50.37	22.69	18.48	44.37	42.28	68.20	59.07
Iraq	97.75	98.98	90.98	93.03	2.25	1.02	88.99	84.09	31.57	31.58	80.26	87.32	85.68	87.42
Japan	71.72	58.82	48.49	34.54	28.28	41.18	57.85	39.07	22.40	14.49	50.72	37.03	30.14	24.58
Jordan	99.57	98.46	96.05	92.30	0.43	1.54	91.88	84.03	28.75	24.46	89.61	87.41	81.69	81.35
Kazakhstan	95.87	93.23	77.87	76.44	4.13	6.77	74.07	68.41	21.20	28.65	66.20	66.18	68.13	72.56
Korea (Republic of)	85.25	89.88	61.35	75.10	14.75	10.12	63.16	72.85	22.44	33.73	51.86	65.54	55.97	59.20
Kyrgyzstan	96.75	98.02	84.82	89.46	3.25	1.98	76.96	78.81	41.08	52.18	71.51	83.39	81.88	90.18
Lebanon	96.02	95.49	82.61	78.57	3.98	4.51	75.95	66.92	31.88	15.16	61.80	67.95	82.83	83.78
Libya	99.62	99.72	93.61	90.83	0.38	0.28	85.29	83.03	33.29	30.89	85.56	82.43	94.51	92.93
Malaysia	98.54	99.54	88.38	87.50	1.46	0.46	79.69	91.72	43.00	36.10	74.54	59.79	94.31	84.62
Mexico	87.70	90.09	50.85	59.52	12.30	9.91	41.61	58.01	20.79	18.75	29.23	32.87	75.79	72.83
Morocco	98.00	93.67	83.25	75.08	2.00	6.33	78.01	61.92	21.72	20.42	77.41	63.42	88.39	79.67
Netherlands	37.63	30.64	14.60	11.16	62.37	69.36	21.95	20.76	4.80	3.25	13.63	7.96	23.06	17.69
New Zealand	42.41	27.39	19.56	8.67	57.59	72.61	26.83	14.78	5.60	2.83	17.12	9.32	26.56	14.37
Nigeria	99.72	99.58	94.49	93.14	0.28	0.42	86.30	86.18	42.30	41.78	80.78	79.92	91.70	89.98
Pakistan	99.91	99.89	98.39	98.52	0.09	0.11	84.35	85.72	52.42	60.38	90.90	92.18	93.75	92.00
Peru	89.22	88.50	51.89	50.00	10.78	11.50	39.78	40.71	14.59	14.32	28.06	32.26	81.58	76.33
Philippines	99.00	99.50	87.54	90.44	1.00	0.50	70.89	75.50	38.92	43.61	73.81	77.81	91.74	92.83
Romania	86.18	85.84	61.64	61.75	13.82	14.16	51.65	51.71	21.26	19.92	56.99	53.49	66.74	62.05
Russian Federation	88.68	90.68	71.48	74.61	11.32	9.32	71.19	70.85	23.42	27.65	61.65	67.77	53.27	56.96
Singapore	91.87	77.14	72.51	49.87	8.13	22.86	75.39	49.97	25.30	17.46	50.00	37.94	66.48	56.07
Thailand	95.58	95.80	74.46	80.17	4.42	4.20	66.87	68.54	29.16	33.17	51.34	56.42	84.74	81.04
Tunisia	96.91	96.68	86.65	84.26	3.09	3.32	81.09	83.49	25.11	24.92	80.43	71.15	86.20	77.08
Türkiye	95.61	91.08	84.35	77.34	4.39	8.92	76.36	70.02	31.35	32.68	78.94	65.65	75.82	75.57
Ukraine	86.05	84.21	63.64	65.55	13.95	15.79	61.00	56.51	17.07	24.77	56.87	55.89	57.40	61.82
United States	55.86	50.22	28.84	26.15	44.14	49.78	38.87	35.31	6.79	8.62	14.75	13.90	33.89	30.78
Uruguay	77.46	60.78	39.56	22.36	22.54	39.22	31.68	31.57	9.65	5.24	35.34	18.24	54.38	44.34
Zimbabwe	99.47	98.62	84.20	78.25	0.53	1.38	77.47	62.17	15.20	14.32	55.20	55.39	95.93	95.62
Overall average ^a	86.91	84.58	65.35	63.16	13.09	15.42	59.46	56.93	23.53	22.82	52.90	51.32	70.89	67.52

Notes

- a Weighted based on the population ages 15 and older from UNDESA (2022) for the 38 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 47 percent of the world population.

Definitions

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index 2 (GSNI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among seven indicators.

Share of people with no bias: Percentage of people with zero biases among seven indicators.

Share of people biased by dimension: Percentage of people with bias for the dimension (regardless of the number of biases among component indicators).

Main data sources

Columns 1–14: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022, accessed 12 January 2023).

TABLE A3b

Gender Social Norms Index, trends by gender

Country or territory	GSNI (share of people with at least one bias)				GSNI2 (share of people with at least two biases)				Share of people with no bias			
	2010-2014		2017-2022		2010-2014		2017-2022		2010-2014		2017-2022	
	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Men (%)
Argentina	69.05	73.47	69.71	74.33	35.06	45.41	31.85	38.50	30.95	26.53	30.29	25.67
Armenia	92.44	98.71	90.42	95.27	74.28	92.56	68.42	82.25	7.56	1.29	9.58	4.73
Australia	37.06	53.17	29.05	43.26	15.34	30.73	9.98	23.41	62.94	46.83	70.95	56.74
Brazil	89.38	90.47	84.17	84.78	45.91	59.53	43.09	52.66	10.62	9.53	15.83	15.22
Chile	70.49	78.13	76.39	83.41	33.02	52.33	45.88	59.51	29.51	21.87	23.61	16.59
China	89.89	95.77	90.04	93.97	66.62	76.19	63.61	74.30	10.11	4.23	9.96	6.03
Colombia	91.63	91.47	92.76	89.61	54.33	60.60	58.29	59.74	8.37	8.53	7.24	10.39
Cyprus	77.78	86.08	77.50	83.75	46.26	61.48	52.27	64.00	22.22	13.92	22.50	16.25
Ecuador	93.15	93.60	91.41	92.83	55.30	62.46	59.60	64.34	6.85	6.40	8.59	7.17
Germany	50.41	65.05	33.06	42.12	22.02	35.16	9.96	16.79	49.59	34.95	66.94	57.88
Hong Kong, China (SAR)	86.57	89.09	78.43	83.14	55.22	63.70	50.18	61.44	13.43	10.91	21.57	16.86
Iraq	95.27	100.00	98.12	99.83	82.99	98.28	90.41	95.62	4.73	0.00	1.88	0.17
Japan	69.01	74.42	54.44	64.17	45.61	51.36	31.21	38.61	30.99	25.58	45.56	35.83
Jordan	99.65	99.49	98.10	98.81	96.19	95.91	89.83	94.74	0.35	0.51	1.90	1.19
Kazakhstan	94.59	97.81	91.26	95.68	72.63	85.86	71.40	82.73	5.41	2.19	8.74	4.32
Korea (Republic of)	81.99	88.67	86.83	93.08	55.72	67.26	70.06	80.40	18.01	11.33	13.17	6.92
Kyrgyzstan	96.29	97.23	97.44	98.99	80.93	88.90	88.12	91.71	3.71	2.77	2.56	1.01
Lebanon	94.58	97.53	93.07	97.95	78.16	87.29	71.45	85.79	5.42	2.47	6.93	2.05
Libya	99.30	99.90	99.44	100.00	88.76	97.87	85.69	95.81	0.70	0.10	0.56	0.00
Malaysia	97.31	99.70	99.69	99.39	82.44	94.01	84.66	90.34	2.69	0.30	0.31	0.61
Mexico	88.13	87.27	88.89	91.27	49.12	52.57	58.49	60.53	11.87	12.73	11.11	8.73
Morocco	96.39	99.51	90.83	96.50	70.36	95.39	68.83	81.33	3.61	0.49	9.17	3.50
Netherlands	30.10	46.13	27.21	34.41	11.50	18.10	7.66	15.01	69.90	53.87	72.79	65.59
New Zealand	37.34	49.60	23.16	32.73	14.88	26.19	5.63	12.42	62.66	50.40	76.84	67.27
Nigeria	99.54	99.89	99.13	100.00	91.96	96.96	89.02	97.03	0.46	0.11	0.87	0.00
Pakistan	99.81	100.00	100.00	99.79	97.53	99.16	98.35	98.65	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.21
Peru	87.50	90.89	88.03	88.96	48.27	55.39	44.72	55.07	12.50	9.11	11.97	11.04
Philippines	99.00	98.99	99.67	99.33	84.00	91.11	89.80	91.09	1.00	1.01	0.33	0.67
Romania	84.27	88.56	82.15	91.65	58.70	65.29	54.66	72.91	15.73	11.44	17.85	8.35
Russian Federation	84.28	94.40	87.02	96.02	64.27	80.88	68.00	84.25	15.72	5.60	12.98	3.98
Singapore	90.19	93.91	76.59	77.78	70.03	75.54	47.12	53.06	9.81	6.09	23.41	22.22
Thailand	96.46	94.78	95.18	96.43	73.32	75.76	78.46	82.00	3.54	5.22	4.82	3.57
Tunisia	93.82	99.47	95.08	98.53	76.97	94.69	79.84	89.36	6.18	0.53	4.92	1.47
Türkiye	94.39	96.87	88.45	93.65	79.14	89.65	71.42	83.12	5.61	3.13	11.55	6.35
Ukraine	81.80	92.32	80.91	89.19	55.44	75.74	58.85	75.68	18.20	7.68	19.09	10.81
United States	52.31	59.63	50.69	49.81	24.72	33.20	25.04	27.10	47.69	40.37	49.31	50.19
Uruguay	78.05	76.82	60.20	62.03	36.59	42.86	21.18	24.89	21.95	23.18	39.80	37.97
Zimbabwe	99.51	99.42	98.80	98.44	79.14	90.14	74.87	81.66	0.49	0.58	1.20	1.56
Overall average ^a	84.44	89.52	82.96	86.53	60.70	70.36	59.23	67.81	15.56	10.48	17.04	13.47

Notes

- a Weighted based on the population ages 15 and older from UNDESA (2022) for the 38 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) and wave 7 (2017–2022) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 47 percent of the world population.

Definitions

Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI): Percentage of people with at least one bias among seven indicators.

Gender Social Norms Index 2 (GSNI2): Percentage of people with at least two biases among seven indicators.

Share of people with no bias: Percentage of people with zero biases among seven indicators.

Main data sources

Columns 1–12: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and others 2022, accessed 12 January 2023).

TABLE A4

Gender Development Index

HDI RANK		SDG 3					SDG 4.3		SDG 4.4		SDG 8.5		
		Gender Development Index		Human Development Index		Life expectancy at birth		Expected years of schooling		Mean years of schooling		Estimated gross national income per capita ^a	
				Value		(years)		(years)		(years)		(2017 PPP \$)	
		Value	Group ^b	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Very high human development													
1	Switzerland	0.967	2	0.944	0.976	85.9	82.0	16.4	16.6	13.5	14.2	54,597	79,451 ^d
2	Norway	0.983	1	0.950	0.966	84.9	81.6	18.9 ^e	17.5	13.1	12.9	54,699	74,445
3	Iceland	0.976	1	0.947	0.971	84.2	81.2	20.3 ^e	18.1 ^f	13.9	13.7	47,136	64,004
4	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.976	1	0.941	0.964	88.3 ^g	82.7 ^h	17.6	17.0	11.8	12.7	51,735	75,307 ^d
5	Australia	0.968	2	0.932	0.963	85.8	83.2 ^h	21.8 ^e	20.3 ⁱ	12.8	12.6	37,486	61,161
6	Denmark	0.980	1	0.937	0.957	83.3	79.5	19.3 ^e	18.1 ^f	13.2	12.8	49,876	70,961
7	Sweden	0.988	1	0.941	0.952	84.9	81.1	20.5 ^e	18.3 ^f	12.8	12.4	49,580	59,326
8	Ireland	0.987	1	0.934	0.947	83.8	80.2	19.2 ^e	18.6 ^f	11.8 ^j	11.4 ^j	61,104	91,506 ^d
9	Germany	0.978	1	0.931	0.952	83.2	78.1	17.0	17.0	13.8 ⁱ	14.3 ⁱ	46,150	63,143
10	Netherlands	0.968	2	0.925	0.956	83.4	80.0	19.0 ^{ej}	18.4 ^{uj}	12.4	12.8	46,301	65,778
11	Finland	0.989	1	0.934	0.945	84.7	79.3	19.9 ^e	18.3 ^f	13.0	12.7	41,698	57,394
12	Singapore	0.992	1	0.935	0.943	84.9	80.6	16.7	16.4	11.6	12.3	75,094 ^j	105,348 ^d
13	Belgium	0.978	1	0.925	0.946	84.3	79.4	20.7 ^e	18.5 ^f	12.3	12.4	42,533	62,295
13	New Zealand	0.975	1	0.925	0.948	84.3	80.6	20.8 ^e	19.7 ^f	12.9	13.0	36,864	51,377
15	Canada	0.988	1	0.929	0.941	84.7	80.6	16.9	15.9	13.9 ^j	13.7 ^j	38,652	55,065
16	Liechtenstein	..	..	..	..	85.4	81.1	14.2	16.2	..	..	..	..
17	Luxembourg	0.993	1	0.925	0.931	84.8	80.4	14.4	14.4	13.0 ^k	13.0 ^j	70,117	98,991 ^d
18	United Kingdom	0.987	1	0.922	0.934	82.8	78.7	17.8	16.8	13.4	13.4	37,374	53,265
19	Japan	0.970	2	0.908	0.936	87.7 ^g	81.8	15.2 ⁱ	15.2 ⁱ	13.3	13.4	30,621	54,597
19	Korea (Republic of)	0.944	3	0.894	0.947	86.8	80.4	16.1	16.9	11.9 ^j	13.2 ^j	29,300	59,737
21	United States	1.001	1	0.920	0.919	80.2	74.3	16.9	15.6	13.7	13.6	51,539	78,238 ^d
22	Israel	0.992	1	0.915	0.922	84.3	80.2	16.7	15.4	13.4 ^j	13.3 ^j	34,960	48,126
23	Malta	0.980	1	0.907	0.925	86.1	81.4	17.4	16.3	12.0	12.4	30,282	46,821
23	Slovenia	0.999	1	0.915	0.916	83.8	77.6	18.4 ^e	16.9	12.8	12.8	33,038	46,386
25	Austria	0.980	1	0.906	0.924	84.1	79.0	16.4	15.6	12.0	12.6	43,414	64,148
26	United Arab Emirates	0.953	2	0.877	0.921	80.9	77.2	16.5	15.2	12.5	12.8	28,921	77,318 ^d
27	Spain	0.986	1	0.896	0.909	85.8	80.2	18.4 ^e	17.4	10.5	10.7	31,213	45,784
28	France	0.990	1	0.898	0.907	85.5	79.4	16.2	15.5	11.4	11.8	38,403	53,988
29	Cyprus	0.972	2	0.882	0.907	83.2	79.2	15.7	15.6	12.4	12.5	30,617	45,735
30	Italy	0.970	2	0.879	0.906	85.1	80.5	16.6	15.9	10.6	10.9	31,100	55,187
31	Estonia	1.021	1	0.898	0.879	81.2	72.8	16.8	15.1	13.8	13.3	30,995	45,866
32	Czechia	0.989	1	0.884	0.893	80.9	74.7	16.8	15.7	12.7	13.0	30,455	47,289
33	Greece	0.969	2	0.872	0.900	82.9	77.5	20.1 ^e	20.0 ^f	11.1	11.7	22,890	35,368
34	Poland	1.008	1	0.878	0.872	80.4	72.6	16.8	15.3	13.3	13.0	25,261	41,336
35	Bahrain	0.927	3	0.829	0.894	80.0	77.8	17.0	15.9	10.8	11.2	16,786	53,359
35	Lithuania	1.030	2	0.888	0.862	78.8	68.8	16.7	15.9	13.6	13.4	33,891	42,500
35	Saudi Arabia	0.917	4	0.826	0.901	78.8	75.6	16.2	16.1	10.7	11.7	20,678	64,708
38	Portugal	0.994	1	0.863	0.867	84.1	77.8	17.0	16.7	9.6	9.5	28,713	38,127
39	Latvia	1.025	1	0.873	0.852	77.8	69.2	16.8	15.6	13.6	12.9	27,882	38,506
40	Andorra	..	..	..	..	84.3	77.2	..	..	10.5 ^j	10.6 ^j	..	..
40	Croatia	0.995	1	0.855	0.859	81.1	74.2	15.9	14.4	11.9 ^j	12.5 ^j	23,888	36,713
42	Chile	0.967	2	0.838	0.867	81.4	76.5	17.0	16.5	10.8 ^j	11.0 ^j	17,553	31,677
42	Qatar	1.019	1	0.866	0.850	80.9	78.3	14.5	12.1	11.6 ^j	9.6 ^j	42,101	104,066 ^d
44	San Marino	..	..	..	..	83.5	78.4	11.8	12.8	10.9	10.7	..	..
45	Slovakia	0.999	1	0.847	0.848	78.4	71.5	15.0	14.0	12.9	13.0	24,849	36,813
46	Hungary	0.987	1	0.840	0.851	77.9	71.1	15.3 ⁱ	14.8 ⁱ	12.1	12.4	25,909	40,262
47	Argentina	0.997	1	0.833	0.836	78.6	72.2	19.2 ^e	16.6	11.4 ^j	10.9 ^j	15,581	26,376
48	Türkiye	0.937	3	0.806	0.860	79.1	73.0	17.9	18.8 ^f	7.9	9.4	19,079	42,929
49	Montenegro	0.981	1	0.823	0.840	79.8	73.0	15.6	14.6	11.8 ^j	12.6 ^j	15,935	26,001
50	Kuwait	1.009	1	0.831	0.824	81.5	77.2	17.0 ^j	13.9 ^j	8.1 ^j	6.9 ^j	28,086	68,827
51	Brunei Darussalam	0.984	1	0.819	0.833	76.9	72.6	14.4	13.5	9.2 ^j	9.2	47,579	80,261 ^d
52	Russian Federation	1.016	1	0.828	0.815	74.8	64.2	16.0	15.6	12.8 ^k	12.8 ^k	21,857	33,288
53	Romania	0.994	1	0.819	0.823	77.9	70.6	14.7	13.8	11.0	11.6	24,554	35,874
54	Oman	0.900	4	0.752	0.835	74.7	71.0	15.0	14.5	12.1	11.4	7,169	39,717
55	Bahamas	..	..	..	..	75.1	68.1	..	..	12.7 ^j	12.6 ^j	25,897	35,495
56	Kazakhstan	0.998	1	0.809	0.811	73.1	65.5	16.0	15.5	12.4 ^j	12.3 ^j	18,976	29,305
57	Trinidad and Tobago	0.985	1	0.801	0.814	76.4	69.7	14.8 ^m	14.2 ^m	11.7 ^j	11.5 ^j	16,794	30,166
58	Costa Rica	0.996	1	0.806	0.810	79.8	74.4	17.1	16.0	8.9	8.7	16,568	23,376
58	Uruguay	1.022	1	0.812	0.795	79.3	71.7	17.3 ⁿ	15.4 ⁿ	9.3	8.7	17,125	25,680

Continued →

TABLE A4

HDI RANK	Gender Development Index		Human Development Index		SDG 3		SDG 4.3		SDG 4.4		SDG 8.5	
					Life expectancy at birth		Expected years of schooling		Mean years of schooling		Estimated gross national income per capita ^a	
					Value		Value		Value		Value	
	Value	Group ^b	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	2021	2021	2021	2021	2021	2021	2021 ^c	2021 ^c	2021 ^c	2021 ^c	2021	2021
60 Belarus	1.011	1	0.812	0.803	77.7	67.3	15.3	15.0	12.2	12.1	15,158	23,165
61 Panama	1.017	1	0.812	0.798	79.6	73.0	13.6 ⁱ	12.5 ⁱ	10.8	10.3	23,380	30,531
62 Malaysia	0.982	1	0.794	0.809	77.4	72.7	13.8	12.9	10.6	10.7	20,672	32,380
63 Georgia	1.007	1	0.803	0.798	76.7	66.8	15.9	15.2	12.9	12.8	11,285	18,472
63 Mauritius	0.973	2	0.789	0.811	76.8	70.4	15.9 ⁱ	14.5 ⁱ	10.0 ⁱ	10.9 ⁱ	15,016	29,221
63 Serbia	0.982	1	0.794	0.808	77.2	71.2	15.0	13.9	11.0	11.8	15,306	23,270
66 Thailand	1.012	1	0.805	0.796	83.0	74.5	16.2 ^m	15.6 ^m	8.6	8.8	15,457	18,694
Medium human development												
67 Albania	1.007	1	0.799	0.794	79.2	74.1	15.3	13.7	11.7 ⁱ	10.9 ⁱ	11,637	16,630
68 Bulgaria	0.995	1	0.792	0.796	75.5	68.4	14.2	13.6	11.5	11.3	18,109	28,357
68 Grenada	..	..	..	..	77.9	72.2	19.3 ^{ej}	18.1 ^{ij}	..	..	..	..
70 Barbados	1.034	2	0.799	0.773	79.4	75.6	17.7 ⁱ	13.8 ⁱ	10.3 ^o	9.1 ^o	10,235	14,555
71 Antigua and Barbuda	..	..	..	..	80.9	75.8	15.2 ⁱ	13.2 ⁱ	..	..	..	..
72 Seychelles	..	..	..	..	75.7	67.7	15.1	12.9	10.2	10.4	..	..
73 Sri Lanka	0.949	3	0.755	0.795	79.5	73.1	14.5 ⁱ	13.8 ⁱ	10.8	10.8	7,005	18,573
74 Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.940	3	0.754	0.802	77.5	73.1	14.1 ^p	13.5 ^p	9.8	11.4	10,709	19,917
75 Saint Kitts and Nevis	..	..	..	..	75.3	68.3	16.0 ⁱ	14.9 ⁱ	..	..	..	..
76 Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.880	5	0.704	0.800	76.8	71.2	14.7	14.5	10.6 ⁱ	10.7 ⁱ	3,767	22,041
77 Ukraine	1.012	1	0.776	0.766	76.7	66.5	15.0 ⁱ	14.9 ⁱ	11.5 ^o	10.7 ^o	10,370	16,605
78 North Macedonia	0.945	3	0.746	0.789	76.2	71.7	13.9 ⁱ	13.4 ⁱ	9.7	10.8	11,147	20,716
79 China	0.984	1	0.761	0.773	81.2	75.5	14.8 ⁱ	13.7 ⁱ	7.3 ^o	7.9 ^o	13,980	20,883
80 Dominican Republic	1.014	1	0.772	0.761	76.3	69.3	15.4 ⁱ	13.6 ⁱ	9.6 ⁿ	9.0 ⁿ	13,695	22,248
80 Moldova (Republic of)	1.010	1	0.771	0.763	73.5	64.4	14.8	14.1	11.9	11.8	12,087	17,961
80 Palau	..	..	..	..	70.6	62.4	16.0 ⁱ	15.5 ⁱ	..	..	..	..
83 Cuba	0.961	2	0.745	0.775	76.4	71.2	15.1	13.8	12.6 ⁱ	12.4 ⁱ	5,103	10,693
84 Peru	0.950	2	0.742	0.781	74.7	70.1	15.2 ⁱ	15.5 ⁱ	9.3 ⁱ	10.5 ⁱ	9,813	14,727
85 Armenia	1.001	1	0.757	0.756	77.4	66.6	13.8	12.5	11.3	11.3	8,736	18,558
86 Mexico	0.989	1	0.753	0.761	74.9	66.1	15.2	14.5	9.1	9.4	12,456	23,600
87 Brazil	0.994	1	0.750	0.755	76.0	69.6	16.0	15.2	8.3 ⁱ	7.9 ⁱ	10,903	17,960
88 Colombia	0.984	1	0.744	0.756	76.4	69.4	14.7	14.2	9.0	8.7	10,281	18,599
89 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.970	2	0.739	0.761	72.4	67.4	14.9 ⁱ	14.5 ⁱ	10.9	10.7	8,720	15,075
90 Maldives	0.925	3	0.709	0.766	81.0	79.1	14.2	11.9	7.1	7.5	6,359	22,119
91 Algeria	0.880	5	0.680	0.773	78.0	74.9	15.3 ^m	14.0 ^m	7.7 ⁱ	8.4 ⁱ	3,550	17,787
91 Azerbaijan	0.974	2	0.734	0.753	73.3	65.6	13.6	13.4	10.2	10.9	10,536	18,076
91 Tonga	0.965	2	0.728	0.754	73.7	68.4	16.3 ⁱ	15.7 ⁱ	11.5 ^o	11.2 ^o	4,842	8,845
91 Turkmenistan	0.956	2	0.726	0.760	72.7	65.9	13.0	13.4	10.9	11.6	9,227	16,884
95 Ecuador	0.980	1	0.731	0.745	77.5	70.3	14.9	14.3	8.8	8.8	7,451	13,180
96 Mongolia	1.031	2	0.749	0.726	75.7	66.5	15.6	14.4	9.9	8.8	8,541	12,666
97 Egypt	0.882	5	0.666	0.755	72.6	67.9	13.8 ⁱ	13.7 ⁱ	9.8 ⁱ	9.4 ⁱ	3,536	19,741
97 Tunisia	0.931	3	0.697	0.748	77.1	70.7	16.5 ⁱ	14.5 ⁱ	6.9 ⁱ	8.0 ⁱ	4,870	15,778
99 Fiji	0.931	3	0.698	0.750	68.9	65.4	15.0 ⁱ	14.5 ⁱ	11.0 ⁱ	10.8 ⁱ	5,664	14,270
99 Suriname	1.001	1	0.728	0.727	73.6	67.2	14.2 ^m	11.9 ^m	9.9 ^m	9.6 ^m	8,866	16,506
101 Uzbekistan	0.944	3	0.703	0.744	73.4	68.3	12.4	12.6	11.7	12.1	5,427	10,403
102 Dominica	..	..	..	..	76.3	69.7	14.6 ⁱ	12.2 ⁱ	..	..	..	..
102 Jordan	0.887	5	0.663	0.748	76.8	72.1	10.8	10.5	10.1	10.8	3,778	15,631
104 Libya	0.975	1	0.708	0.726	74.4	69.6	13.1 ^q	12.6 ^q	8.5 ^r	7.2 ^r	9,570	20,960
105 Paraguay	0.990	1	0.713	0.720	73.4	67.4	13.6 ⁿ	12.4 ⁿ	8.9	8.9	9,410	15,265
106 Palestine, State of	0.891	5	0.655	0.735	75.9	71.1	14.3	12.5	9.9	10.0	2,250	10,937
106 Saint Lucia	1.011	1	0.719	0.711	74.7	67.8	13.4	12.4	8.8	8.3	9,991	14,147
108 Guyana	0.978	1	0.704	0.720	69.1	62.5	12.8 ⁱ	12.2 ⁱ	8.7	8.5	14,735	30,534
109 South Africa	0.944	3	0.686	0.727	65.0	59.5	14.0	13.3	9.7	12.2	9,935	16,129
110 Jamaica	0.990	1	0.704	0.711	72.5	68.5	13.7 ^m	13.1 ⁱ	9.7 ⁱ	8.5 ⁱ	6,982	10,715
111 Samoa	0.957	2	0.685	0.716	75.5	70.3	13.0	11.9	11.8	11.0	3,223	7,312
112 Gabon	0.908	4	0.667	0.735	68.5	63.5	12.6 ^q	13.4 ^q	7.8 ^s	10.5 ^s	9,376	17,212
112 Lebanon	0.882	5	0.650	0.737	77.3	72.8	11.1 ^t	11.5 ^t	8.5 ^u	8.9 ^u	3,815	15,586
114 Indonesia	0.941	3	0.681	0.723	69.7	65.5	13.8 ⁱ	13.7 ⁱ	8.2	8.9	7,906	14,976
115 Viet Nam	1.002	1	0.704	0.702	78.2	69.1	13.2 ^u	12.7 ^u	8.0	8.7	6,932	8,826
Medium human development												
116 Philippines	0.990	1	0.695	0.702	71.5	67.2	13.5	12.8	9.2	8.7	7,487	10,311
117 Botswana	0.981	1	0.686	0.700	63.6	58.7	12.4 ⁱ	12.2 ⁱ	10.3	10.4	13,839	18,618

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TABLE A4

HDI RANK	Gender Development Index		Human Development Index		SDG 3		SDG 4.3		SDG 4.4		SDG 8.5	
					Life expectancy at birth		Expected years of schooling		Mean years of schooling		Estimated gross national income per capita ^a	
					(years)		(years)		(years)		(2017 PPP \$)	
	Value	Group ^b	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
118 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.964	2	0.680	0.705	66.8	60.9	14.9	15.0	9.2	10.5	6,856	9,359
118 Kyrgyzstan	0.966	2	0.675	0.698	74.4	65.8	13.4	13.0	11.6 ^o	11.1 ^o	2,863	6,331
120 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.983	1	0.679	0.691	75.2	66.3	13.8 ^t	11.8 ^t	11.4 ^t	10.8 ^t	2,866	6,796
121 Iraq	0.803	5	0.585	0.728	72.4	68.2	11.5 ^u	12.7 ^u	7.2 ^m	8.4 ^m	2,184	17,748
122 Tajikistan	0.909	4	0.648	0.713	73.7	69.6	12.7 ^t	12.1 ^t	10.9 ^o	11.8 ^o	2,980	6,096
123 Belize	0.975	1	0.672	0.689	74.3	67.1	13.3	12.7	9.0	8.7	4,249	8,345
123 Morocco	0.861	5	0.621	0.722	76.4	71.9	13.9	14.4	5.0	6.9	3,194	11,356
125 El Salvador	0.964	2	0.660	0.685	75.1	66.1	12.7 ⁿ	12.6 ⁿ	6.8	7.6	5,824	11,015
126 Nicaragua	0.956	2	0.648	0.678	76.8	70.8	12.7 ^t	12.6 ⁿ	7.4	6.8	3,646	7,661
127 Bhutan	0.937	3	0.641	0.684	73.8	70.1	13.6 ^t	12.8 ^t	4.5 ^t	5.8 ^t	6,671	11,896
128 Cabo Verde	0.981	1	0.653	0.666	78.5	69.6	12.8 ^t	12.3 ^t	6.0 ^t	6.6 ^t	4,682	7,796
129 Bangladesh	0.898	5	0.617	0.688	74.3	70.6	13.0	11.9	6.8	8.0	2,811	8,176
130 Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	69.1	60.8	9.5 ^t	9.3 ^t	10.4	10.8	..	..
131 Marshall Islands	..	..	..	..	67.2	63.7	10.4	10.1	10.7	11.1	..	..
132 India	0.849	5	0.567	0.668	68.9	65.8	11.9	11.8	6.3 ^o	7.2 ^o	2,277	10,633
133 Ghana	0.946	3	0.614	0.649	66.0	61.6	12.1	12.0	7.8 ^o	9.0 ^o	4,723	6,771
134 Micronesia (Federated States of)	..	..	..	..	74.6	67.1	..	..	..	..	..	..
135 Guatemala	0.917	4	0.596	0.650	72.7	66.0	10.5	10.6	5.2	6.2	4,909	12,614
136 Kiribati	..	..	..	..	69.1	65.5	12.4	11.3	..	..	..	..
137 Honduras	0.960	2	0.607	0.633	72.5	67.9	10.4 ⁿ	9.9 ⁿ	6.8	7.4	4,271	6,304
138 Sao Tome and Principe	0.907	4	0.584	0.643	70.4	65.2	13.5	13.3	5.6 ^m	6.8 ^m	2,415	5,635
139 Namibia	1.004	1	0.616	0.613	63.0	55.7	11.9 ^v	11.9 ^v	7.5 ^o	6.9 ^o	7,271	10,094
140 Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.949	3	0.591	0.623	70.1	66.2	9.9	10.3	5.0	5.8	6,757	8,627
140 Timor-Leste	0.917	4	0.580	0.633	69.5	66.1	12.2 ^t	13.0 ^t	4.7	6.2	3,642	5,248
140 Vanuatu	..	..	..	..	72.9	68.4	11.4 ^t	11.7 ^t	..	..	2,354	3,809
143 Nepal	0.942	3	0.584	0.621	70.4	66.6	12.9	12.8	4.2 ^o	6.2 ^o	3,677	4,095
144 Eswatini (Kingdom of)	0.986	1	0.593	0.601	61.2	53.4	13.2 ^t	14.2 ^t	5.7	5.5	6,384	8,993
145 Equatorial Guinea	..	..	..	..	62.7	58.8	..	..	4.2 ^p	7.6 ^p	8,351	15,399
146 Cambodia	0.926	3	0.570	0.615	72.3	66.8	11.0 ^w	11.9 ^w	4.4	5.9	3,464	4,706
146 Zimbabwe	0.961	2	0.580	0.604	62.0	56.2	12.0 ^t	12.3 ^t	8.3 ^t	9.2 ^t	3,286	4,397
148 Angola	0.903	4	0.557	0.617	64.3	59.0	11.5	12.9	4.2	6.9	4,751	6,197
149 Myanmar	0.944	3	0.565	0.599	69.0	62.5	11.1 ^t	10.7 ^t	6.1	6.7	2,619	5,093
150 Syrian Arab Republic	0.825	5	0.503	0.610	75.2	69.1	9.1	9.2	4.6 ^q	5.6 ^q	1,285	7,088
151 Cameroon	0.885	5	0.540	0.610	62.0	58.7	12.4 ^t	13.8 ^t	4.8 ^o	7.5 ^o	2,981	4,264
152 Kenya	0.941	3	0.557	0.592	64.1	58.9	10.3 ^t	11.1 ^t	6.1	7.3	3,873	5,084
153 Congo	0.934	3	0.552	0.590	64.9	62.1	12.2 ^t	12.4 ^t	5.6	6.8	2,532	3,247
154 Zambia	0.965	2	0.554	0.574	63.9	58.5	10.9 ^w	11.0 ^w	7.2 ^o	7.2 ^o	2,615	3,837
155 Solomon Islands	..	..	..	..	72.0	68.9	10.8 ^t	9.9 ^t	..	..	2,173	2,777
156 Comoros	0.891	5	0.522	0.585	65.8	61.2	12.2 ^t	11.7 ^t	4.0 ^q	6.0 ^q	2,014	4,260
156 Papua New Guinea	0.931	3	0.538	0.578	68.4	62.9	9.8 ^v	10.9 ^v	4.1	5.4	3,543	4,445
158 Mauritania	0.890	5	0.518	0.582	66.1	62.7	9.6	9.2	4.6 ^o	5.3 ^o	2,604	7,650
159 Côte d'Ivoire	0.887	5	0.516	0.581	59.9	57.4	10.0	11.3	4.7 ^o	5.7 ^o	3,763	6,643
Low human development												
160 Tanzania (United Republic of)	0.943	3	0.532	0.565	68.3	64.2	9.3	9.1	5.9 ^t	6.9 ^t	2,247	3,092
161 Pakistan	0.810	5	0.471	0.582	68.6	63.8	8.1	9.2	3.9	5.0	1,569	7,620
162 Togo	0.849	5	0.497	0.586	62.4	60.8	12.2 ^t	14.3 ^t	3.4 ^o	6.8 ^o	1,885	2,446
163 Haiti	0.898	5	0.506	0.564	66.1	60.4	9.0 ^t	10.4 ^t	4.6	6.8	2,408	3,295
163 Nigeria	0.863	5	0.495	0.574	53.1	52.3	9.6 ^v	10.8 ^v	6.1 ^w	8.2 ^w	3,759	5,800
165 Rwanda	0.954	2	0.521	0.547	68.2	63.8	11.2	11.2	4.0 ^t	4.9 ^t	1,990	2,440
166 Benin	0.880	5	0.491	0.558	61.4	58.2	9.9	11.6	3.3 ^o	5.4 ^o	2,998	3,819
166 Uganda	0.927	3	0.505	0.545	64.9	60.4	10.2 ^v	10.1 ^v	4.9 ^o	6.7 ^o	1,877	2,492
168 Lesotho	0.985	1	0.511	0.519	55.9	50.4	12.4 ^t	11.7 ^t	6.6 ^o	6.0 ^o	2,107	3,310
169 Malawi	0.968	2	0.502	0.519	66.5	59.5	12.8 ^t	12.5 ^t	4.1 ^o	4.7 ^o	1,232	1,713
170 Senegal	0.874	5	0.475	0.543	69.3	64.8	9.5	8.5	1.6 ^t	4.5 ^t	2,258	4,468
171 Djibouti	..	..	..	..	65.0	59.7	7.5 ^t	7.4 ^t	..	..	2,179	7,911
172 Sudan	0.870	5	0.466	0.535	67.9	62.7	7.7 ^t	8.1 ^t	3.4	4.2	1,833	5,320
173 Madagascar	0.956	2	0.490	0.512	66.9	62.2	10.2 ^t	10.1 ^t	4.9 ^v	5.3 ^v	1,284	1,682
174 Gambia	0.924	4	0.481	0.520	63.5	60.7	10.3 ^v	8.5 ^v	3.8	5.6	1,649	2,701
175 Ethiopia	0.921	4	0.478	0.519	68.3	61.9	9.8 ^t	9.6 ^t	2.2	4.2	1,944	2,774
176 Eritrea	..	..	..	..	68.7	64.3	7.5 ^t	8.6 ^t	..	..	1,387	2,079

Continued –

TABLE A4

HDI RANK	Gender Development Index		Human Development Index		SDG 3		SDG 4.3		SDG 4.4		SDG 8.5	
					Life expectancy at birth		Expected years of schooling		Mean years of schooling		Estimated gross national income per capita ^a	
					Value		(years)		(years)		(2017 PPP \$)	
	Value	Group ^b	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
177 Guinea-Bissau	0.867	5	0.448	0.517	61.8	57.4	10.0 ⁱ	11.2 ⁱ	2.4	4.9	1,561	2,264
178 Liberia	0.871	5	0.447	0.513	62.1	59.4	10.1	10.8	3.9	6.3	1,062	1,518
179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	0.885	5	0.449	0.507	61.5	57.0	9.6 ⁱ	10.1 ⁱ	5.6 ^m	8.5 ^m	896	1,259
180 Afghanistan	0.681	5	0.365	0.536	65.3	58.9	7.7 ⁱ	12.7 ⁱ	2.3	3.4	533	3,089
181 Sierra Leone	0.893	5	0.452	0.506	61.4	58.8	9.6 ⁱ	9.9 ⁱ	3.5 ^o	5.8 ^o	1,453	1,789
182 Guinea	0.850	5	0.426	0.501	60.1	57.6	8.6 ⁱ	11.0 ⁱ	1.3 ⁱ	3.2 ⁱ	2,320	2,645
183 Yemen	0.496	5	0.263	0.529	67.1	60.6	7.7	10.5	2.9 ^x	5.1 ^x	176	2,428
184 Burkina Faso	0.903	4	0.425	0.471	61.0	57.5	9.1	9.2	1.6 ⁱ	2.7 ⁱ	1,659	2,580
185 Mozambique	0.922	4	0.428	0.464	62.4	56.2	9.8 ⁱ	10.7 ⁱ	2.4 ⁱ	4.1 ⁱ	1,096	1,304
186 Mali	0.887	5	0.399	0.450	60.3	57.6	6.8 ⁱ	7.9 ⁱ	2.4	2.2	1,483	2,770
187 Burundi	0.935	3	0.412	0.441	63.6	59.7	10.9 ⁱ	10.5 ⁱ	2.5 ⁱ	3.9 ⁱ	668	797
188 Central African Republic	0.810	5	0.359	0.443	56.3	51.6	6.7 ⁱ	9.4 ⁱ	3.1	5.6	770	1,162
189 Niger	0.835	5	0.364	0.436	62.8	60.4	6.3 ⁱ	7.6 ⁱ	1.7 ^o	2.8 ^o	936	1,535
190 Chad	0.770	5	0.339	0.441	54.3	50.8	6.6 ⁱ	9.5 ⁱ	1.5 ^v	3.7 ^v	965	1,760
191 South Sudan	0.843	5	0.348	0.413	56.5	53.4	4.5 ⁱ	6.6 ⁱ	4.8	6.2	664	873
Other countries or territories												
Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of)	..	..	..	..	75.7	70.8	10.4 ^t	11.1 ^t	..	..	..	..
Monaco	..	..	..	..	87.7 ^g	84.3 ^h	..	..	..	..	..	..
Nauru	..	..	..	..	67.3	60.3	13.1 ⁱ	10.4 ⁱ	..	..	..	..
Somalia	..	..	..	..	57.4	53.2	..	..	..	..	545	1,489
Human development groups												
Very high human development	0.986	–	0.889	0.901	81.6	75.6	16.9	16.1	12.2	12.4	33,849	53,887
High human development	0.973	–	0.742	0.763	77.7	71.9	14.6	13.8	8.1	8.5	11,187	19,089
Medium human development	0.880	–	0.586	0.666	69.4	65.6	12.0	11.9	6.5	7.4	2,912	9,668
Low human development	0.864	–	0.477	0.552	63.4	59.3	9.0	9.9	4.1	5.7	1,907	4,107
Developing countries	0.937	–	0.660	0.704	72.3	67.6	12.3	12.3	7.2	7.9	7,097	14,230
Regions												
Arab States	0.871	–	0.645	0.741	73.1	68.9	12.2	12.5	7.6	8.6	4,745	21,667
East Asia and the Pacific	0.978	–	0.740	0.756	78.5	72.9	14.2	13.4	7.6	8.1	12,357	18,711
Europe and Central Asia	0.961	–	0.778	0.810	76.4	69.4	15.3	15.6	10.4	10.8	13,162	25,834
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.986	–	0.747	0.757	75.6	68.8	15.2	14.4	9.0	9.0	10,667	18,486
South Asia	0.852	–	0.568	0.667	69.8	66.1	11.5	11.6	6.3	7.3	2,352	10,426
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.907	–	0.519	0.572	62.1	58.2	10.0	10.6	5.1	6.9	2,970	4,429
Least developed countries	0.894	–	0.508	0.568	66.6	61.9	10.0	10.4	4.5	6.0	1,993	3,777
Small island developing states	0.962	–	0.715	0.743	73.1	67.8	12.5	12.4	8.9	9.4	12,634	20,928
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	0.985	–	0.891	0.905	82.0	76.1	16.8	16.1	12.2	12.4	35,117	55,363
World	0.958	–	0.715	0.747	74.0	68.9	12.9	12.7	8.4	8.9	12,241	21,210

TABLE A4

Notes	Definitions	Main data sources
a Because disaggregated income data are not available, data are crudely estimated. See Definitions and <i>Technical note 3</i> at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2022_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Gender Development Index is calculated.	Gender Development Index: Ratio of female to male HDI values. See <i>Technical note 3</i> at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2022_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Gender Development Index is calculated.	Column 1: Calculated based on data in columns 3 and 4.
b Countries are divided into five groups by absolute deviation from gender parity in HDI values.	Gender Development Index groups: Countries are divided into five groups by absolute deviation from gender parity in HDI values. Group 1 comprises countries with high equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of less than 2.5 percent), group 2 comprises countries with medium to high equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of 2.5–5 percent), group 3 comprises countries with medium equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of 5–7.5 percent), group 4 comprises countries with medium to low equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of 7.5–10 percent) and group 5 comprises countries with low equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation from gender parity of more than 10 percent).	Column 2: Calculated based on data in column 1.
c Data refer to 2021 or the most recent year available.		Columns 3 and 4: HDRO calculations based on data from Barro and Lee (2018), ILO (2022), IMF (2022), UNDESA (2022), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022), United Nations Statistics Division (2022) and World Bank (2022).
d In calculating the male HDI value, estimated gross national income per capita is capped at \$75,000.		Columns 5 and 6: UNDESA (2022).
e In calculating the female HDI value, expected years of schooling is capped at 18 years.		Columns 7 and 8: CEDLAS and World Bank (2022), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022) and UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.
f In calculating the male HDI value, expected years of schooling is capped at 18 years.		Columns 9 and 10: Barro and Lee (2018), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, OECD (2022), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022) and UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.
g In calculating the female HDI value, life expectancy at birth is capped at 87.5 years.	Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. See <i>Technical note 1</i> at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2022_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the HDI is calculated.	Columns 11 and 12: HDRO calculations based on ILO (2022), IMF (2022), UNDESA (2022), United Nations Statistics Division (2022) and World Bank (2022).
h In calculating the male HDI value, life expectancy at birth is capped at 82.5 years.	Life expectancy at birth: Number of years a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth stay the same throughout the infant's life.	
i Updated by HDRO based on data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).	Expected years of schooling: Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child's life.	
j In calculating the female HDI value, estimated gross national income per capita is capped at \$75,000.	Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from educational attainment levels using official durations of each level.	
k Updated by HDRO based on data from OECD (2022) and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).	Estimated gross national income per capita: Derived from the ratio of female to male wages, female and male shares of economically active population and gross national income (in 2017 purchasing power parity terms). See <i>Technical note 3</i> at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2022_technical_notes.pdf for details.	
l HDRO estimate based on data from Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.		
m Updated by HDRO based on data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022) and UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for various years.		
n Updated by HDRO based on data from CEDLAS and World Bank (2022) and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).		
o Updated by HDRO based on data from Barro and Lee (2018) and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).		
p Based on data from the national statistical office.		
q Based on cross-country regression.		
r Updated by HDRO using projections from Barro and Lee (2018).		
s Updated by HDRO based on data from Barro and Lee (2018) and ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for various years.		
t Updated by HDRO based on data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics for various years.		
u Updated by HDRO based on data from UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for various years.		
v Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for various years and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).		
w Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for various years.		
x Based on projections from Barro and Lee (2018).		

TABLE A5

Gender Inequality Index

			SDG 3.1	SDG 3.7	SDG 5.5	SDG 4.4		Labour force participation rate ^a		
			Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education				
			Gender Inequality Index	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)	
			Value	Rank		Female	Male	Female	Male	
HDI RANK		2021	2021	2017	2021	2021	2021 ^b	2021 ^b	2021	2021
Very high human development										
1	Switzerland	0.018	3	5	2.2	39.8	96.9	97.5	61.7	72.7
2	Norway	0.016	2	2	2.3	45.0	99.1	99.3	60.3	72.0
3	Iceland	0.043	8	4	5.4	47.6	99.8	99.7	61.7	70.5
4	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	..	..	..	1.6	..	77.1	83.4	53.5	65.8
5	Australia	0.073	19	6	8.1	37.9	94.6	94.4	61.1	70.5
6	Denmark	0.013	1	4	1.9	39.7	95.1	95.2	57.7	66.7
7	Sweden	0.023	4	4	3.3	47.0	91.8	92.2	61.7	68.0
8	Ireland	0.074	21	5	5.9	27.3	88.1 ^c	86.0 ^c	56.5	68.6
9	Germany	0.073	19	7	7.5	34.8	96.1 ^c	96.5 ^c	56.8	66.0
10	Netherlands	0.025	5	5	2.8	39.1	89.8	92.7	62.4	71.3
11	Finland	0.033	6	3	4.2	46.0	99.0	98.5	56.5	64.0
12	Singapore	0.040	7	8	2.6	29.8	80.5	85.9	59.4	76.8
13	Belgium	0.048	10	5	5.3	42.9	87.2	89.7	49.8	58.8
13	New Zealand	0.088	25	9	12.6	49.2	82.0	81.8	65.1	75.3
15	Canada	0.069	17	10	7.0	34.4	100.0 ^d	100.0 ^d	60.8	69.7
16	Liechtenstein	..	..	..	3.0	28.0	..	..	..	..
17	Luxembourg	0.044	9	5	4.3	35.0	100.0 ^e	100.0 ^e	58.5	65.5
18	United Kingdom	0.098	27	7	10.5	31.1	99.8	99.8	58.0	67.1
19	Japan	0.083	22	5	2.9	14.2	95.9	92.7	53.3	71.0
19	Korea (Republic of)	0.067	15	11	2.2	19.0	83.1 ^c	93.1 ^c	53.4	72.4
21	United States	0.179	44	19	16.0	27.0	96.5	96.4	55.2	66.4
22	Israel	0.083	22	3	7.6	28.3	91.6 ^c	93.7 ^c	58.5	66.1
23	Malta	0.167	42	6	11.5	13.4	82.2	88.1	53.1	71.4
23	Slovenia	0.071	18	7	4.5	21.5	97.6	98.7	53.8	62.2
25	Austria	0.053	12	5	5.5	39.3	100.0 ^d	100.0 ^d	55.5	66.3
26	United Arab Emirates	0.049	11	3	3.1	50.0	82.0	85.6	46.5	88.0
27	Spain	0.057	14	4	6.3	42.3	78.5	83.2	52.7	62.4
28	France	0.083	22	8	9.5	37.8	83.5	87.9	51.9	59.7
29	Cyprus	0.123	35	6	6.8	14.3	81.1	84.8	56.6	68.8
30	Italy	0.056	13	2	4.0	35.3	78.6	86.1	39.9	57.6
31	Estonia	0.100	28	9	8.8	25.7	97.6	98.1	57.5	70.2
32	Czechia	0.120	34	3	9.7	22.1	99.8	99.8	51.7	68.1
33	Greece	0.119	32	3	8.5	21.7	69.9	77.8	43.3	58.1
34	Poland	0.109	31	2	9.7	27.5	86.5	90.7	49.2	65.5
35	Bahrain	0.181	46	14	8.7	18.8	79.9	83.1	42.4	83.5
35	Lithuania	0.105	30	8	10.4	27.7	95.5	97.9	57.3	67.9
35	Saudi Arabia	0.247	59	17	11.9	19.9	71.3	80.9	30.9	80.1
38	Portugal	0.067	15	8	7.4	40.0	59.7	61.9	54.0	62.2
39	Latvia	0.151	40	19	11.2	29.0	99.7 ^c	99.3 ^c	54.5	66.8
40	Andorra	..	..	..	5.9	46.4	70.7 ^c	72.4 ^c	..	..
40	Croatia	0.093	26	8	8.6	31.1	97.0 ^c	100.0 ^c	45.9	58.8
42	Chile	0.187	47	13	24.1	32.7	80.3 ^c	83.5 ^c	44.2	65.5
42	Qatar	0.220	54	9	7.1	4.4	79.8 ^c	69.6 ^c	57.2	95.5
44	San Marino	..	..	..	3.8	33.3	81.8	84.3	..	..
45	Slovakia	0.180	45	5	26.3	22.7	98.9	99.2	54.7	66.4
46	Hungary	0.221	55	12	22.1	13.1	97.6	98.8	52.1	67.2
47	Argentina	0.287	69	39	39.1	44.4	71.0 ^f	71.4 ^f	50.0	71.6
48	Türkiye	0.272	65	17	16.9	17.3	56.3	75.9	31.8	69.4
49	Montenegro	0.119	32	6	10.4	24.7	92.3 ^c	99.2 ^c	47.8	62.0
50	Kuwait	0.305	74	12	5.6	1.5	60.9 ^c	55.2 ^c	47.4	83.8
51	Brunei Darussalam	0.259	61	31	10.0	9.1	70.4	71.2	54.1	72.3
52	Russian Federation	0.203	50	17	15.0	16.5	92.8 ^e	95.9 ^e	54.5	69.7
53	Romania	0.282	67	19	36.4	18.5	88.8	93.7	42.8	62.3
54	Oman	0.300	72	19	9.9	9.9	96.6	99.9	28.7	85.0
55	Bahamas	0.329	78	70	25.7	20.0	87.0 ^c	89.9 ^c	65.6	71.5
56	Kazakhstan	0.161	41	10	21.9	24.5	99.8 ^c	100.0 ^c	63.3	75.5
57	Trinidad and Tobago	0.344	81	67	38.1	32.4	84.8 ^d	80.6 ^d	46.7	68.0
58	Costa Rica	0.256	60	27	37.1	45.6	56.2	54.5	47.5	71.1
58	Uruguay	0.235	58	17	36.2	26.2	59.6	55.5	54.8	69.3

Continued –

TABLE A5

HDI RANK	Gender Inequality Index		SDG 3.1	SDG 3.7	SDG 5.5	SDG 4.4		Labour force participation rate ^a	
			Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education			
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)	
			Female	Male	Female	Male			
60 Belarus	0.104	29	2	11.9	34.7	97.5	99.0	57.3	71.4
61 Panama	0.392	96	52	69.9	22.5	70.2	68.7	50.4	72.6
62 Malaysia	0.228	57	29	9.3	14.9	75.0	78.4	51.2	77.6
63 Georgia	0.280	66	25	31.7	19.3	97.1	98.3	51.0	68.0
63 Mauritius	0.347	82	61	24.6	20.0	64.4 ^c	70.8 ^c	43.4	70.4
63 Serbia	0.131	36	12	14.9	39.2	88.6	95.3	46.6	62.3
66 Thailand	0.333	79	37	32.7	13.9	47.6	51.7	59.0	75.0
High human development									
67 Albania	0.144	39	15	14.5	35.7	95.4 ^f	93.0 ^d	50.7	66.2
68 Bulgaria	0.210	52	10	38.6	23.8	94.9	96.5	49.1	62.6
68 Grenada	..	..	25	32.7	32.1	..	..	..	..
70 Barbados	0.268	64	27	42.3	29.4	95.4 ^d	86.0 ^d	56.1	63.7
71 Antigua and Barbuda	..	..	42	33.1	31.4	..	..	..	..
72 Seychelles	..	..	53	53.4	22.9	..	..	..	..
73 Sri Lanka	0.383	92	36	15.7	5.4	84.0	84.2	30.9	68.5
74 Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.136	38	10	9.9	24.6	82.7	94.0	32.3	52.4
75 Saint Kitts and Nevis	..	..	..	38.2	25.0	..	..	..	..
76 Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.459	115	16	30.2	5.6	71.6 ^c	76.0 ^c	14.4	68.1
77 Ukraine	0.200	49	19	15.6	20.8	96.2 ^d	95.8 ^f	48.1	63.6
78 North Macedonia	0.134	37	7	16.4	41.7	61.9	75.1	42.4	63.4
79 China	0.192	48	29	11.0	24.9	78.3 ^d	85.4 ^d	61.6	74.3
80 Dominican Republic	0.429	106	95	65.6	25.7	77.4 ^c	76.9 ^c	49.6	75.2
80 Moldova (Republic of)	0.205	51	19	27.8	39.6	96.1	98.0	33.9	43.9
80 Palau	..	..	..	42.5	6.9	96.9	97.3	..	..
83 Cuba	0.303	73	36	48.8	53.4	89.5 ^c	91.9 ^c	40.3	68.5
84 Peru	0.380	90	88	56.8	40.0	59.3 ^c	69.9 ^c	66.1	81.9
85 Armenia	0.216	53	26	18.5	33.6	96.0	97.1	42.7	63.0
86 Mexico	0.309	75	33	54.4	49.8	65.1	66.7	43.8	75.4
87 Brazil	0.390	94	60	45.2	14.8	62.4 ^c	59.1 ^c	49.1	68.2
88 Colombia	0.424	102	83	59.0	19.6	58.9	56.5	52.2	78.0
89 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.390	94	68	47.9	18.2	44.1	39.6	52.9	74.1
90 Maldives	0.348	83	53	7.3	4.6	46.4 ^d	41.5 ^d	34.3	67.5
91 Algeria	0.499	126	112	11.7	7.5	46.0 ^c	56.9 ^c	15.7	64.5
91 Azerbaijan	0.294	70	26	40.1	18.2	93.6	97.6	60.4	67.3
91 Tonga	0.631	160	52	19.0	0.0 ^g	93.5 ^d	93.1 ^d	37.3	55.3
91 Turkmenistan	0.177	43	7	21.8	25.0	93.5	92.2	36.5	55.6
95 Ecuador	0.362	85	59	63.2	39.4	53.0	52.0	53.3	76.5
96 Mongolia	0.313	76	45	26.7	17.1	79.3	73.0	51.5	66.6
97 Egypt	0.443	109	37	44.8	22.9	81.6 ^c	76.6 ^c	15.4	67.1
97 Tunisia	0.259	61	43	6.7	26.3	42.9 ^c	51.8 ^c	25.5	67.2
99 Fiji	0.318	77	34	26.8	21.6	90.2 ^d	87.9 ^d	37.7	75.3
99 Suriname	0.427	105	120	56.1	29.4	69.9 ^h	70.7 ^h	43.4	65.1
101 Uzbekistan	0.227	56	29	15.9	28.7	99.9	100.0	44.9	70.9
102 Dominica	..	..	..	38.5	34.4	..	..	..	..
102 Jordan	0.471	118	46	25.4	11.8	77.4	84.2	13.5	62.3
104 Libya	0.259	61	72	6.9	16.0	70.5 ⁱ	45.1 ⁱ	34.1	61.0
105 Paraguay	0.445	111	84	70.3	16.8	52.5	54.0	59.6	84.2
106 Palestine, State of	..	..	27	43.5	..	67.9	67.6	16.7	66.3
106 Saint Lucia	0.381	91	117	36.9	24.1	49.9	43.8	63.2	73.2
108 Guyana	0.454	114	169	66.6	35.7	69.5	62.2	40.3	64.1
109 South Africa	0.405	97	119	61.2	46.0 ^j	68.9	87.7	46.2	59.9
110 Jamaica	0.335	80	80	32.8	31.0	74.3 ^d	66.4 ^d	56.1	70.0
111 Samoa	0.418	99	43	43.6	7.8	79.1 ^k	71.6 ^k	30.7	54.2
112 Gabon	0.541	140	252	91.2	18.7	67.2 ⁱ	84.0 ⁱ	39.1	57.0
112 Lebanon	0.432	108	29	20.3	4.7	54.3 ^k	55.6 ^k	20.8	64.3
114 Indonesia	0.444	110	177	33.9	21.0	51.0	58.2	53.7	81.7
115 Viet Nam	0.296	71	43	34.6	30.3	61.3	69.6	69.6	79.4
Medium human development									
116 Philippines	0.419	101	121	48.2	28.0	73.4	69.1	43.8	68.3
117 Botswana	0.468	117	144	49.3	10.8	91.3	91.8	56.3	65.1
118 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.418	99	155	63.8	48.2	60.1	69.7	68.3	83.8

Continued →

TABLE A5

HDI RANK	Gender Inequality Index		SDG 3.1	SDG 3.7	SDG 5.5	SDG 4.4		Labour force participation rate ^a	
			Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education			
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15–19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)	
			Female	Male	Female	Male			
118 Kyrgyzstan	0.370	87	60	34.7	20.5	100.0 ^d	99.8 ^d	42.1	71.7
120 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.492	123	125	82.7	22.2	79.8 ^d	75.4 ^d	34.3	67.8
121 Iraq	0.558	145	79	62.2	28.9	42.0 ^h	52.9 ^h	11.1	71.8
122 Tajikistan	0.285	68	17	45.4	23.4	93.5 ^d	94.6 ^d	30.2	50.5
123 Belize	0.364	86	36	57.1	19.6	54.5	49.8	46.9	76.8
123 Morocco	0.425	104	70	25.9	20.4	30.9	37.1	22.0	66.0
125 El Salvador	0.376	88	46	55.9	27.4	42.7	51.4	43.6	72.6
126 Nicaragua	0.424	102	98	85.6	50.5	51.2	49.7	46.8	81.3
127 Bhutan	0.415	98	183	19.0	16.7	23.6	32.3	51.6	67.4
128 Cabo Verde	0.349	84	58	55.2	38.9	28.8 ^m	31.2 ^m	46.9	61.7
129 Bangladesh	0.530	131	173	75.5	20.9	50.6	58.5	34.9	78.8
130 Tuvalu	..	..	..	33.1	6.3	60.0	60.7	..	..
131 Marshall Islands	..	..	..	58.0	6.1	91.6	92.5	..	..
132 India	0.490	122	133 ^a	17.2	13.4	41.8 ^d	53.8 ^d	19.2	70.1
133 Ghana	0.529	130	308	64.2	14.5	58.0 ^d	73.2 ^d	64.5	72.2
134 Micronesia (Federated States of)	..	..	88	35.8	7.1	..	..	..	..
135 Guatemala	0.481	121	95	64.1	19.4	29.5	35.8	37.4	80.3
136 Kiribati	..	..	92	40.5	6.7	..	..	..	..
137 Honduras	0.431	107	65	72.0	27.3	35.8	44.8	42.3	78.9
138 Sao Tome and Principe	0.494	124	130	79.4	23.6	39.9 ^h	48.4 ^h	37.1	69.9
139 Namibia	0.445	111	195	64.9	35.6	41.5 ^d	44.1 ^d	54.5	62.2
140 Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.478	120	185	73.2	22.0	37.7	47.7	74.8	78.1
140 Timor-Leste	0.378	89	142	33.9	38.5	33.7	41.8	61.0	72.2
140 Vanuatu	..	..	72	64.1	0.0 ^g	..	..	59.7	78.0
143 Nepal	0.452	113	186	63.8	33.6	28.8 ^d	44.7 ^d	78.7	80.8
144 Eswatini (Kingdom of)	0.540	138	437	69.9	18.4	34.0	36.2	45.6	53.6
145 Equatorial Guinea	..	..	301	139.7	20.3	..	..	49.9	58.5
146 Cambodia	0.461	116	160	45.5	19.8	18.3	31.7	74.0	85.9
146 Zimbabwe	0.532	134	458	94.3	34.6	61.8 ^c	72.4 ^c	79.3	88.9
148 Angola	0.537	136	241	138.4	29.5	28.2	51.5	74.0	79.1
149 Myanmar	0.498	125	250	33.0	15.0	38.5	47.8	41.0	70.0
150 Syrian Arab Republic	0.477	119	31	38.7	11.2	37.1 ^o	43.4 ^o	15.7	70.8
151 Cameroon	0.565	148	529	110.4	31.1	36.8 ^d	55.0 ^d	70.2	80.7
152 Kenya	0.506	128	342	64.2	23.2	31.1 ^d	37.7 ^d	71.0	75.6
153 Congo	0.564	147	378	103.6	13.6	48.0	52.0	65.1	67.6
154 Zambia	0.540	138	213	117.0	15.1	47.1 ^d	56.8 ^d	69.2	77.8
155 Solomon Islands	..	..	104	60.3	8.0	..	..	83.1	87.4
156 Comoros	..	..	273	58.2	16.7	..	..	32.1	54.5
156 Papua New Guinea	0.725	169	145	55.3	0.0 ^g	10.8	15.5	46.3	48.1
158 Mauritania	0.632	161	766	78.0	20.3	14.5 ^d	21.9 ^d	27.4	62.2
159 Côte d'Ivoire	0.613	155	617	105.0	15.6	23.9 ^d	32.2 ^d	45.9	64.9
Low human development									
160 Tanzania (United Republic of)	0.560	146	524	123.7	36.9	13.0 ^c	19.1 ^c	79.5	87.1
161 Pakistan	0.534	135	140	42.3	19.9	22.1	28.7	20.7	78.1
162 Togo	0.580	149	396	77.9	18.7	13.9 ^d	42.3 ^d	55.5	59.4
163 Haiti	0.635	163	480	52.5	2.7 ^p	27.9	41.0	60.7	68.9
163 Nigeria	0.680	168	917	101.7	4.5	40.4 ^q	55.3 ^q	47.9	59.6
165 Rwanda	0.388	93	248	32.4	55.7	11.4 ^c	16.3 ^c	82.5	82.2
166 Benin	0.602	152	397	92.3	8.4	21.1 ^d	34.4 ^d	69.3	72.6
166 Uganda	0.530	131	375	107.9	33.8	29.3	36.3	64.2	71.3
168 Lesotho	0.557	144	544	89.6	22.9	27.2 ^f	24.6 ^f	56.1	71.3
169 Malawi	0.554	142	349	117.9	22.9	21.3 ^d	28.4 ^d	71.6	80.0
170 Senegal	0.530	131	315	66.5	43.0	11.1 ^c	30.9 ^c	33.5	56.7
171 Djibouti	..	..	248	22.7	26.2	..	..	17.2	44.1
172 Sudan	0.553	141	295	79.9	31.0 ^f	16.4	20.1	28.7	67.8
173 Madagascar	0.556	143	335	119.4	17.2	27.3 ^s	29.8 ^s	81.5	87.6
174 Gambia	0.611	153	597	63.2	8.6	29.9	43.2	48.9	66.3
175 Ethiopia	0.520	129	401	69.2	39.5	9.1	20.1	72.3	84.7
176 Eritrea	..	..	480	64.4	22.0 ^p	..	..	70.2	83.6
177 Guinea-Bissau	0.627	159	667	87.5	13.7	9.8	22.8	63.9	78.4
178 Liberia	0.648	164	661	123.4	9.7	20.8	39.2	69.8	79.7

Continued –

TABLE A5

HDI RANK	Gender Inequality Index		SDG 3.1	SDG 3.7	SDG 5.5	SDG 4.4		Labour force participation rate ^a	
			Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education			
	Value	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	(% held by women)	(% ages 25 and older)		(% ages 15 and older)	
			2017	2021	2021	2021 ^b	2021 ^b	2021	2021
179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	0.601	151	473	109.0	14.3	40.3 ^b	69.1 ^b	61.2	69.1
180 Afghanistan	0.678	167	638	82.6	27.2	6.4	14.9	14.8	66.5
181 Sierra Leone	0.633	162	1,120	100.9	12.3	34.7 ^d	51.5 ^d	56.1	55.9
182 Guinea	0.621	157	576	114.8	16.7 ⁱ	7.2 ^c	19.7 ^c	62.1	62.2
183 Yemen	0.820	170	164	54.4	0.3	22.4	37.5	6.0	67.6
184 Burkina Faso	0.621	157	320	110.5	6.3	11.3 ^c	17.1 ^c	57.2	72.7
185 Mozambique	0.537	136	289	165.8	42.4	10.8 ^c	20.2 ^c	77.7	78.9
186 Mali	0.613	155	562	150.1	27.3	8.0	15.5	57.7	79.7
187 Burundi	0.505	127	548	53.6	38.9	7.8 ^c	13.0 ^c	79.0	77.4
188 Central African Republic	0.672	166	829	160.5	12.9	13.9	31.6	63.3	79.5
189 Niger	0.611	153	509	170.5	25.9	9.2 ^d	15.2 ^d	61.7	84.3
190 Chad	0.652	165	1,140	138.3	32.3	7.7 ⁱ	24.4 ^s	46.9	69.9
191 South Sudan	0.587	150	1,150	99.2	32.3	26.5	36.4	70.4	73.6
Other countries or territories									
Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of)	..	..	89	2.3	17.6	..	..	77.2	86.1
Monaco	..	..	..	7.2	33.3	..	..	..	..
Nauru	..	..	..	72.5	10.5	..	..	..	..
Somalia	..	..	829	118.0	24.6	..	..	20.9	47.0
Human development groups									
Very high human development	0.155	–	15	14.1	29.1	87.0	89.4	52.6	68.4
High human development	0.329	–	62	28.0	25.8	72.7	78.0	53.6	73.5
Medium human development	0.494	–	175	38.1	21.8	44.0	54.2	28.8	71.3
Low human development	0.577	–	499	89.5	24.3	22.8	34.1	49.3	73.2
Developing countries	0.487	–	247	46.5	23.9	56.9	64.7	44.4	72.8
Regions									
Arab States	0.536	–	150	45.3	18.3	53.8	60.4	19.3	69.5
East Asia and the Pacific	0.337	–	82	21.6	20.9	71.4	78.2	59.7	75.2
Europe and Central Asia	0.227	–	20	20.1	26.1	83.4	89.7	42.9	67.0
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.381	–	75	53.4	33.2	63.2	63.2	48.6	72.7
South Asia	0.508	–	153	28.9	17.6	42.2	52.8	21.6	71.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.569	–	536	100.9	25.7	31.1	44.3	62.1	72.3
Least developed countries	0.562	–	417	93.7	24.7	27.5	38.7	54.6	75.8
Small island developing states	0.461	–	212	50.9	26.7	62.1	65.7	50.4	68.7
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	0.185	–	18	19.2	32.4	86.7	89.1	51.8	67.8
World	0.465	–	225	42.5	25.9	64.2	70.3	46.2	71.7

TABLE A5

Notes		Definitions	Main data sources
a	Estimates modelled by the International Labour Organization.	Gender Inequality Index: A composite measure reflecting inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. See <i>Technical note 4</i> at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2022_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Gender Inequality Index is calculated.	Column 1: HDRO calculations based on data in columns 3–9.
b	Data refer to 2021 or the most recent year available.		Column 2: Calculated based on data in column 1.
c	Updated by HDRO based on data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).		Column 3: WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and United Nations Population Division (2019).
d	Updated by HDRO based on data from Barro and Lee (2018) and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).	Maternal mortality ratio: Number of deaths due to pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births.	Column 4: UNDESA (2022).
e	Updated by HDRO based on data from OECD (2022) and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).	Adolescent birth rate: Number of births to women ages 15–19 per 1,000 women ages 15–19.	Column 5: IPU (2022).
f	HDRO estimate based on data from Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.	Share of seats in parliament: Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament expressed as a percentage of total seats. For countries with a bicameral legislative system, the share of seats is calculated based on both houses.	Columns 6 and 7: Barro and Lee (2018), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, OECD (2022), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022) and UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.
g	In calculating the Gender Inequality Index, a value of 0.1 percent was used.	Population with at least some secondary education: Percentage of the population ages 25 and older that has reached (but not necessarily completed) a secondary level of education.	Columns 8 and 9: ILO (2022).
h	Updated by HDRO based on data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022) and UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for various years.	Labour force participation rate: Proportion of the working-age population (ages 15 and older) that engages in the labour market, either by working or actively looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the working-age population.	
i	Updated by HDRO using projections from Barro and Lee (2018).		
j	Excludes the 36 special rotating delegates appointed on an ad hoc basis.		
k	Based on cross-country regression.		
l	Updated by HDRO based on data from Barro and Lee (2018) and ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for various years.		
m	Updated by HDRO based on data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics for various years.		
n	A special update by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and United Nations Population Division (2019), communicated to HDRO on 7 September 2020.		
o	Based on projections from Barro and Lee (2018).		
p	Refers to 2019.		
q	Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for various years.		
r	Refers to 2018.		
s	Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for various years and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2022).		
t	Refers to 2020.		

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